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ABSTRACT
 Increasingly, many philosophers of science agree that an account of representation 
in science must include an irreducible reference to the intentions, actions, and agency of a 
scientist. Though these pragmatic accounts of scientific representation have numerous 
advantages over alternatives, very little has been said about the reference to agency found 
within. My dissertation uses work from the philosophy of action to fill in some of the 
missing details, offering a better foundation and more complete picture of the nature of 
representation in science. I begin with an overview of the literature in an encyclopedia 
article. I then argue for the communal nature of representation in science, suggesting that 
we cannot understand scientific representation without first understanding how scientists 
license representational vehicles to be used for particular purposes. Next, I argue that an 
account of scientific representation reduced to mental states is mistaken precisely because 
it leaves out the communal element of licensing. The following paper offers the first ever 
account of the nature of scientific, representational actions. The Means-End Account of 
Scientific, Representational Actions relies on the work on the nature of intentional actions 
of G.E.M. Anscombe and suggests that representational actions in science can be 
demarcated from other forms of action in virtue of features that hold of their internal form. 
Relying on a similar point about the relationship between pragmatic accounts of scientific 
representation and the nature of intentional action, my fourth paper argues that the many 
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are complementary with one another and 
allow a more complete understanding of scientific representation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION AND HUMAN 
ACTION
1. Introduction 
If you were to enter a science department on any given university or accompany scientists 
as they collect data in the field, there are several things you would observe. Aside from 
measurement tools, notebooks for data collection, and some subject or phenomenon under 
investigation, you would observe a group of scientists performing actions: experimenting, 
theorizing, and, as I shall explore in this dissertation, representing. My work in this 
dissertation argues for, explores, and advances the view that representation in science exists 
in virtue of the activities of scientists.  This view—the pragmatic view of scientific 
representation—has increased in popularity in recent years and has been defended in a few 
variations by a number of philosophers of science (e.g., Hughes 1997; Bailer-Jones 2003; 
Suárez 2004; Van Fraassen 2008; Giere 2004, 2010). 
 A natural way forward from the important work already conducted by these 
philosophers is to explore in greater detail the relationship between scientific representation 
and human activity. The task I take up in this dissertation is to begin this exploration, 
examining the relationships that hold between scientific representation and human action 
by drawing connections to the literature from analytic action theory. My work in this 
dissertation helps to show how it is that the relationship of representation is grounded in 
human action embedded in a practice. The substantive chapters of the dissertation thus 
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make a useful contribution to the pragmatic perspective of scientific representation, by 
further developing and explaining the nature and role of actions within scientific 
representation. Apart from developing and defending an original analysis of the nature of 
scientific, representational actions (chapter 4), I also argue that the scientific community 
plays an irreducible role in the representational relationship (chapter 3) and offer an 
argument which uses the common groundwork among pragmatic accounts of scientific 
representation to show that they are complementary with one another (chapter 5). Before 
explaining these arguments in greater detail, I will briefly examine the background from 
both philosophy of science and philosophy of action.  
1. Background 
2.1 Philosophy of Science Background 
 Painting with broad strokes, we can trace some of the developments that lead to 
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, paving the way for the insights coming 
from action theory to be applied to scientific representation. Early accounts of scientific 
representation were ‘substantive’ insofar as they offered an account of scientific 
representation in terms of the features which held between the vehicle (e.g. a model) and 
its target (e.g. a real-world system). These accounts, at least as they have been commonly 
interpreted, are “dyadic,” (Knuuttila 2005, 1261) since they conceive of representation as 
a two-place relationship. The two main versions of substantive accounts are similarity-
based and structuralist accounts.  
 Structuralist accounts explain the relationship between representational vehicle and 
its target in terms of shared structure between the vehicle and target, described in terms of 
a functional mapping relationship. For example, one common structuralist account says 
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that the representational relationship between a vehicle and its target holds in virtue of an 
isomorphic relationship, namely the fact that we can draw a bijective (one-to-one and onto) 
function between the structure of the vehicle and the structure of the target. Such a view is 
most famously attributed to Bas van Fraassen (1980).1 Of course, an account of 
representation as isomorphism faces certain problems, especially related to 
misrepresentation which is itself a common practice within science. As such, most 
philosophers interested in defending a structuralist account offer instead an account of 
partial isomorphism (e.g., French and Ladyman 1999; French 2003; Bueno and French 
2011). The important distinction offered by accounts of partial isomorphism is that they 
leave room for misrepresentation and non-representational features of a vehicle and its 
target, since they do not require that every element of the structure be included in the 
isomorphism.  
 The second major type of substantive account of scientific representation says that 
the representational relationship between a vehicle and its target holds in virtue of some 
form of similarity. Similarity is a relationship which is “a weaker interpretation of the 
relationship between model and real system” than structural (partial) isomorphism, insofar 
as it incorporates isomorphism while also leaving room for additional forms of similarity 
(Giere 1988, 81). The most famous defender of a similarity account is Ronald Giere, who 
argues that appealing to similarity to explain representation requires an “implicit” (or 
perhaps in some cases explicit) “specification of relevant respects and degrees” (1988, 81). 
                                                             
1 Though as he and Mauricio Suárez (Ladyman et al. 2011) point out, a purely dyadic interpretation of van 
Fraassen’s understanding of scientific representation in his 1980 book constitutes at least a partial 
misinterpretation of his view, since his account leaves room for the agent. Nonetheless, the dyadic view of 
his account of representation, as it was commonly interpreted, was rather influential. 
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He means that when we rely on similarity to explain a representational relationship, we are 
not invoking just any similarities that happen to hold between vehicle and target, but rather 
specific similarities—taken in some respect, some vehicle is N-degree similar to its target.2  
 Recently, philosophers of science have (for the most part) begun to move away 
from substantive accounts of scientific representation in favor of pragmatic accounts of 
scientific representation. A major part of this movement seems to be due to a set of 
influential arguments against similarity and isomorphism presented and defended by 
Suárez (2003) among others (e.g.  (Frigg 2006). Among the worries he raises are some 
which follow the work of Nelson Goodman (1976) by arguing that there is a mismatch 
between the formal properties of representation on the one hand and similarity or 
isomorphism on the other. Representation is commonly understood to be non-symmetric, 
non-reflexive, and non-transitive. Isomorphism has the opposite qualities for each of these: 
it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. Similarity does share non-transitivity with 
representation, but differs insofar as it is reflexive and symmetric. There is an essential, 
logical mismatch between the relationships of similarity and isomorphism on the one hand 
and representation on the other. As such, both are inadequate with regard to explaining the 
nature of representation in science.  
 Increasingly, and in light of these objections to substantive accounts, many 
philosophers of science agree that if we are to understand the nature of representation in 
science, we must analyze it as a particular sort of activity—as an activity carried out by 
agents working within a broader community, for the sake of particular aims and goals. Put 
                                                             
2 The need to invoke similarities demonstrates, as Suárez suggested, that Giere’s account also left room for 
the role of an agent, even if it was not interpreted that way (Ladyman et al. 2011). 
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otherwise, we must add another member to the relationship of scientific representation and 
offer “(at least) triadic” accounts of scientific representation (Knuuttila 2005, 1261). On 
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, the relationship holds not only between the 
vehicle and its target, but also between the user of the vehicle—where the user can be 
understood as an individual scientist, a group of scientists, or the scientific community in 
general.  
 Pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, now quite numerous, offer 
significant insights into the nature of scientific representation (Hughes 1997; Teller 2001; 
Bailer-Jones 2003; Suárez 2004, 2010, 2015a, Giere 2004, 2010; Contessa 2007; Van 
Fraassen 2008; Mäki 2009; Frisch 2014). The details vary from account to account, but the 
unifying feature of these accounts is an irreducible place for agency: a vehicle represents 
its target because a scientist or group of scientists uses it that way. However, despite the 
insights offered by these accounts and their value in being better able to explain the 
heterogeneity of representational practice in science, there remains important work to be 
done on this approach to the issue of representation in science—including, as I will explore 
in this dissertation, on the nature of the human agency which undergirds representation in 
science.   
 While pragmatic accounts have made good use of the notions of action, agency, 
intention, and use, they have for the most part left these terms unanalyzed and unexplained. 
Given their importance for the pragmatic account of representational relationship (the 
scientist’s action of using the representation is one of the three members of the ‘triadic’ 
account of representation), further analysis of scientific actions stands to deepen and 
advance a pragmatic approach to representation in science. It is for this reason that my 
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dissertation turns to insights about the nature of human action drawn from the literature in 
analytic philosophy of action.  
2.2 Philosophy of Action Background 
 Of course, there are a wide range of views and insights to be found within action 
theory. In order to draw insights, it is important to first narrow down the list of potential 
sources of insights in action theory by referring to ideas about the relevant form of agency 
found within pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. While very little has been 
said about what is meant by agency, there are two guiding points that I take. The two points, 
one negative and the other positive, are each related to the relationship between scientific 
representation and individual mental states. 
 First is the negative claim that scientific representation cannot be explained only 
through reference to individual mental states. Suárez, for example, is explicit in making 
this negative claim when he denies the view that “representation is necessarily the property 
of individuals: representation is ‘in the head’” (Ladyman et al. 2011, 432; c.f. Suárez 2010, 
98–99). On a pragmatic conception of scientific representation, Suárez argues that we must 
avoid “[a]n intentionality conception [of scientific representation which]… takes it that 
sources and targets are determined by some intentional state of some particular agent or 
agents, regardless of community, practice, and indeed any intended or unintended uses” 
(Ladyman et al. 2011, 432). As he says elsewhere, scientific representation is not “in the 
head” (Suárez 2010, 99). Thus, the relevant account of action which will be able to advance 
and deepen pragmatic accounts of scientific representation must not be such that it relies 
exclusively on the nature of mental states.  
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 The second, positive claim offers an idea about what should be included in an 
account of action which is capable of playing such a role. What is important, according to 
the general ideas described by Suárez, is that we be able to understand the relevant actions 
as being communal and socially-based, embedded in the broader practice of science. As he 
puts it, scientific representation is to be found “‘in the world’, and more particularly in the 
social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by those communities 
of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 2010, 99). As such, a 
proper account of action for the purposes at hand will be such that it includes the broader 
scientific practice and the context in which the action is performed as essential components 
in the process of analysis.  
 In light of these considerations, it quickly becomes clear that the ‘standard view’ in 
analytic philosophy of action will not suffice. The ‘standard view’ or ‘causal theory’ argues 
that an action is intentional provided it has the right sort of causal relationship to an agent’s 
mental states. That is to say that an action is intentional provided it is caused by intentions, 
understood as a particular form of mental state (e.g. a desire or a belief). In light of this 
central claim, we can see that it fails to meet the negative claim: that representation will 
not be sufficiently explained in terms of mental states. In addition to this basic problem, 
there are additional issues with the causal theory of action which makes it unsuitable to the 
task at hand.  
 One of the additional concerns with the causal theory for my purposes is explained 
by Harry Frankfurt (1998). The causal theory explains intentional actions in terms of the 
causal antecedents of an action (the mental states) and so “direct[s] attention exclusively 
away from the events whose natures are at issue, and away from the times at which they 
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occur” (Frankfurt 1998, 70). Importantly, this means that the causal theory fails to take 
account of the fact that actions are temporally extended. It can explain only what happens 
before an action begins. After this point, “the subsequent ‘effects’—i.e., the actual 
performance or doing, is simply a matter of nature taking its course” (Frey 2013, 4). As a 
philosopher of science who wants to draw our attention closer to scientific practice, this 
turns out to be no small failure. The causal theory turns our attention inward toward mental 
states, instead of outward towards the broader scientific community and the actual 
performances and doings of the scientist who represents.  
 For these reasons, I avoid the standard account and rely instead upon a different 
tradition within philosophy of action which takes the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, 
especially her book Intention (2000), as its inspiration. The Anscombean perspective on 
the nature of action is markedly different for several reasons, though I will focus on those 
which are relevant to the concerns at hand. For one, Anscombe meets the negative claim 
made by Suárez, since she is clear that an account of mental states will not suffice as an 
account of intentional action. As she says: “intention is never a performance in the mind” 
(2000, 49). 
 Furthermore, Anscombe offers an account of action which draws our attention to 
the actions itself. Indeed, she argues that “the only events to consider [in describing 
intentional actions] are intentional actions themselves…” (2000, 29). The analysis offered 
of intentional actions is made in terms of the descriptions of actions, identified by the 
application of a particular sort of “Why?” question. That is, if we ask someone who is 
engaged in an act of ɸ-ing, “Why are you ɸ-ing?” and they do not refuse this question, then 
the ɸ-ing is intentional (Anscombe 2000, 9). Intentional actions, on her analysis, are 
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distinguished in virtue of the form which holds of the action descriptions (Anscombe 2000, 
84). The form is seen in the teleological order within the characterizations of an action that 
is revealed by the ‘Why?’ question: that someone is A-ing because she’s B-ing and B-ing 
because she’s C-ing. It is this teleological, means-end order which reveals the formal 
characteristics of practical knowledge: it “shews what good, what use, the action is” 
(Anscombe 2005, 114). Importantly, such a conception of intentional actions leaves plenty 
of room for the role of the scientific community—in showing the use of an action, in 
framing the action descriptions, and so on.  
 Anscombe’s account has proven to be useful for the purposes of my dissertation, 
precisely because it allows that we pay close attention to the scientist’s actions, and their 
internal structure in a way which does not exclude or eliminate the role of the broader 
scientific community. The influence of Anscombe’s work is most clearly present in chapter 
four, in which I offer an account of scientific, representational actions which explicitly 
draws upon her views. It is also clear in chapter five, in which I use her work on action 
descriptions to defend a view about the relationship between pragmatic accounts of 
scientific representation. Though it is less salient, there is a similar influence to be found 
in chapter three. In that chapter, I rely upon views presented by Wittgenstein in the 
Philosophical Investigations (2009), which influenced Anscombe.  
2. Descriptive Overview of the Five Major Chapters 
Below, I will offer a brief overview of each of the chapters of my dissertation, with an eye 
towards identifying some of the central themes of the chapters and showing how they 
connect to the central project of my dissertation. 
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 Chapter two is entitled, “An Overview of Philosophical Accounts of Scientific 
Representation.” The chapter provides a substantial and in-depth overview of some of the 
most influential philosophical and sociological accounts of scientific representation. The  
article offers an overview of influential views on scientific representation, arranged in a 
semi-historical narrative about the development of views. In addition to overviewing 
philosophical accounts of scientific representation, I also cover accounts of the nature of 
representation within the model literature and as it is discussed by sociologists of science. 
As can be seen, the semi-historical account of the development of the philosophical and 
sociological literature on scientific representation plays an important role throughout my 
dissertation, providing the more general theoretical context for the other chapters. Among 
other things, the second chapter demonstrates the importance of moving forward with 
pragmatic accounts by further developing the notions of agency and action which are 
central to these accounts.  
 Chapter three is entitled, “There Is a Special Problem of Scientific Representation.” 
There are two primary objectives of the article. First is a response and argument against 
Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen’s influential article, “There Is No Special Problem 
about Scientific Representation” (2006). Callender and Cohen argue that the constitution 
of representation in science is no different from the constitution of representation in any 
other area, for example art or language. So, on their account, the explanation of how it is 
that the Lotka-Volterra model represents its target will be exactly the same as why 
Picasso’s Guernica represents its target. They are open to what the relevant nature of 
representation is, but suggest that the answer will involve a more fundamental 
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representational entity like mental states. Thus, they think that philosophers of science have 
been “concerned with non-issues” (Callender and Cohen 2006, 67). 
 I respond by suggesting that there is something unique about representation in 
science: the way in which representations are licensed. Licensing is the set of activities by 
which the scientific community constructs, develops, establishes, modifies, and uses a 
representational vehicle. Indeed, I argue, we cannot understand the nature of representation 
in science without being attentive to the element of licensing, which extends beyond mental 
states and includes an irreducible reference to the practice in which a representation is 
embedded. As such, I take it that there is still significant work to be done by philosophers 
of science: in understanding how it is that representational vehicles are licensed and used 
by scientists. Thus, one of the major roles of this chapter is clearing intellectual ground for 
continued work on the philosophy of scientific representation, by showing that it cannot be 
reduced to something more fundamental like mental states. 
 Chapter four is entitled “The Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational 
Actions.” In this chapter, I take seriously the idea which lies at the heart of pragmatic 
account of scientific representation: that it is grounded in human actions embedded in the 
broader scientific practice. Though pragmatic accounts of scientific representation make it 
difficult to offer further substantial analysis of the representational relationship (Suárez 
2015a, 47; Knuuttila 2009, 144), I begin my chapter by identifying a few ways to move 
forward to increase our philosophical understanding of representational practice in science. 
One of these ways, which has been and will continue to be explored, is to examine the 
nature and role of specific classes of vehicles, like models, diagrams, model organisms, 
and so on (as is suggested by Knuuttila 2011). Another way forward is to examine what 
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Suárez calls the “means” of scientific representation (2004, 229)—the relationships which 
scientists oftentimes utilize in representing. Exploring representational means can include 
exploring similarity, isomorphism, and other structural relationships of similarity. But 
there is a third way forward, I argue, which has not yet been thoroughly explored: to better 
understand the nature of the actions by which scientists represent. 
 In the chapter, I offer a novel analysis of the nature of scientific, representational 
actions. My account relies primarily on the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, taking her account 
of the nature of intentional actions as a starting point. After introducing her work, I turn to 
offer the Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational Actions, in which scientific, 
representational actions are demarcated from other forms of actions in virtue of three 
features that hold of their internal structure: I) the final description in the means-end 
ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim; (II) that interaction with a vehicle distinct 
from its target stands as an earlier description which is ordered toward the final description 
as means to end; and (III) the means-end structure is licensed by scientific practice, in the 
sense that I describe in chapter three.  
 After applying the account to an example involving the Lotka-Volterra model, I 
turn to examine some of the payoffs of the account. First, as a novel account of the nature 
of scientific, representational actions, the Means-End Account provides a means by which 
we can better understand representational practice in science. Instead of paying attention 
only to vehicles (like models) or other foundational relationships (like isomorphism), we 
can now be attentive to the actions themselves and see their role in representational 
practice. Attending to the actions is valuable not only because it helps to illuminate the 
foundation upon which pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are built, but also 
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because it helps to explain the relationship that holds between the use of vehicles as means 
and the achievement of certain ends. Furthermore, the account suggests that every instance 
of representation in science is also an instance of some other form of scientific activity: an 
explanation, a prediction, an experimentation, and so on. While more work needs to be 
done to flesh out this connection, the Means-End Account offers fruitful material for 
further reflection on these issues.  
 The fifth chapter is entitled, “Pragmatic Accounts of Scientific Representation: A 
Tapestry of Explanation.” It explores an additional payoff of attending to the foundational 
role of action in pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. There are a wide range of 
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, each of which offers its own unique 
analysis of representation. They are all unified, however, in virtue of their reliance upon 
the actions of the representing scientist(s). In this chapter, I argue that the common 
foundation of human agency provides a means by which we can understand how the 
plurality of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are complementary and indeed 
can offer a broader lens through which we can understand representational practice in 
science. I review Anscombe’s account of intentional actions and suggest that what each 
account offers is a different set of action descriptions or characterizations. I argue that a 
single action can have a number of sets of descriptions, each of which is valid, though 
which might have different emphases. So, pragmatic accounts of scientific representation 
are describing one and the same representational action, though they draw our attention to 
different elements and features of the representational action. Most importantly, I argue, 
the plurality of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation is useful because it can help 




AN OVERVIEW OF PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC 
REPRESENTATION3
Scientific representation is the important and useful relationship that holds between 
scientific sources (e.g. models, theories, data models, etc.) and their targets (e.g. real-world 
systems, theoretical objects, etc.). There is a long history of describing the nature of the 
representational relationship between concepts and their objects, but the discussion on 
scientific representation is a relatively recent discussion within the philosophy of science. 
There are a number of different questions one can ask when thinking about scientific 
representation. The question which has received the most attention, and which will receive 
the most attention here, is what might be called, following Callendar and Cohen (2006, 68) 
the “constitution question” of scientific representation: ‘In virtue of what is there 
representation between scientific sources and their targets?’ This has been answered in a 
wide variety of ways, some arguing that it is a structural identity or similarity which ensures 
representation while others argue that there is only a pragmatic relationship. Other 
questions about scientific representation relate more specifically to the ways in which 
representations are used in science. These questions are more typically asked directly about 
certain sorts of representational objects, especially scientific models, as well as from the 
perspective of sociology of science. 
                                                             
3Boesch, B. (2015) Scientific representation. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-repr/. Reprinted here with permission of publisher. 
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1. Substantive Accounts  
 Scientific representation became a rising topic of interest with the development of 
the semantic view of theories which was itself developed partly as a response to the 
syntactic view of theories. Briefly, on the syntactic view, theoretical terms are defined in 
virtue of relationships of equivalence with observational entities (Suppe 1977). This was 
done through the creation of a first-order predicate calculus which contained a number of 
logical operators as well as two sets of terms, one set filled with theoretical terms and the 
other with observational terms. Each theoretical term was defined in terms of a 
correspondence rule linking it directly to an observational term. The logical language also 
included a number of axioms, which were relations between theoretical terms. These 
axioms were understood as the scientific laws, since they showed relationships that held 
among the theoretical terms. Given this purely syntactic relationship between theory and 
observed phenomena, there was no need to give any more detailed account of the 
representation relationship that held between them. The correspondence rule syntactically 
related the theory with observations. 
 The details of the rejection of the syntactic view are beyond the scope of this article, 
but suffice it to say that this view of the structure of theories was widely rejected. With this 
rejection came a different account of the structure of theories, what is often called the 
semantic view. Since there was no longer any direct syntactic relationship between theory 
and observation, it became of interest to explain what relationship does hold between 
theories and observations, and ultimately the world.  
 Before examining the accounts of scientific representation that arose to explain this 
relationship, we should get a basic sense of the semantic view of theories. The common 
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feature of the semantic approach to scientific theories was that they should not be thought 
of as a set of axioms and defined syntactic correspondence between theory and observation. 
Instead, theories are “extralinguistic entities which may be described or characterised by a 
number of different linguistic formulations” (Suppe 1977, 221). That is to say, theories are 
not tied to a single formulation or even to a particular logical language. Instead theories are 
thought of as being a set of related models. This is better understood through Bas van 
Fraassen’s (1980) example. 
 Van Fraassen (1980, 41–43) asks us to consider a set of axioms which are 
constituents of a theory which will be called T1: 
 A0 There is at least one line. 
 A1 For any two lines, there is at most one point that lies on both. 
 A2 For any two points, there is exactly one line that lies on both. 
 A3 On every line there lie at least two points. 
 A4 There are only finitely many points. 
In Figure 2.1, we can see a model which shows that T1 is consistent, since each of the 
axioms is satisfied by this model.  
 
Figure 2.1 Model of Consistency of T1 
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 Notice this is just one model which shows the consistency of T1, since there are 
other models which could be constructed to satisfy the axioms, like van Fraassen’s “Seven 
Point Geometry” (1980, 42). Note that what is meant here by ‘model’ is whatever “satisfies 
the axioms of a theory” (Van Fraassen 1980, 43). Another, perhaps more intuitive, way of 
expressing this is that a model for any theory T is any model which would make T true iif 
the model were the entirety of the universe. For example, if Figure 1 were the entirety of 
the universe, then clearly T1 would be true. Notice also that, on the semantic view, the 
axioms themselves are not central in understanding the theory. Instead, what is important 
in understanding a theory is understanding the set of models which are each truth-makers 
for that theory, insofar as they satisfy the theory.  
 This account of the structure of theories can be applied to an actual scientific theory, 
like classical mechanics. Here, following Ronald Giere (1988, 78–79), we can take up the 
example of the idealized simple systems in physics. These are, he argues, models for the 
theory of classical mechanics. For example, the simple harmonic oscillator is a model 
which is a truth-maker for (part of) classical mechanics. The simple harmonic oscillator 
can be described as a machine: “a linear oscillator with a linear restoring force and no 
others” (Giere 1988, 79); or mathematically: F = -kx. This model, were it the entirety of 
the universe, would make classical mechanics true. 
 The targets of theoretical models on the semantic view are not always real world 
systems. On some views, there is at least one other set of models which serve as the targets 
for theoretical models. These are variably called empirical substructures (Van Fraassen 
1980) or data models. These are ways of structuring the empirical data, typically with some 
mathematical or algebraic method. When scientists gather and describe empirical data, they 
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tend to think of and describe it in an already partially structured way. Part of this structure 
is the result of the way in which scientists measure the phenomena while being particularly 
attentive to certain features (and ignoring or downplaying others). Another part of this 
structuring is due to the patterns seen in the data which are in need of explanation. On some 
views, most notably van Fraassen’s (1980), the empirical model is the phenomenon which 
is being represented. That is to say, there is no further representational relationship holding 
between data models and the world, at least as scientific practice is concerned (for a 
discussion of this, see (Brading and Landry 2006)). Others argue that the relationship 
between theoretical models and data models is only one of a number of interesting 
representational relationships to be described, which set themselves up in a hierarchical 
structure (French and Ladyman 1999, 112–14).  
 With this semantic account of the structure of scientific theories in place, there 
arose an interest to give an account of the representational relationship. The views which 
arose with the semantic view of theories are here called “substantive,” because they all 
attempt to give an account of the representational relationship which looks to substantive 
features of the source and target. Another way of putting this (following Knuuttila (2005)) 
is to say that the substantive accounts of representation seek to explain representation as a 
dyadic relationship which holds between only the source and the target. As will be 
discussed below, this is different from the deflationary and pragmatic accounts which view 
scientific representation as at least a triadic relationship insofar as they add an agent to the 
relationship. There are two major classifications of substantive accounts of the 
representational relationship. The first are the structuralist views which are divided into 
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three main types: isomorphism, partial isomorphism, and homomorphism. The second 
category is the similarity views.  
1.2. Structuralist Views 
 Generically, the structuralist views claim that scientific representation occurs in 
virtue of what might be called “mapping” relationships that hold between the structure of 
the source and the structure of the target, i.e. the parts of the theoretical models point to the 
parts of the data models.  
1.2.1. Isomorphism 
 Isomorphism holds between two objects provided that there is a bijective 
function—i.e., both injective (or one-to-one) and surjective (or onto)—between the source 
and the target. Formally, suppose there are two sets, set A and set B. Set A is isomorphic 
to set B (and vice versa) if and only if there is a function, call it f, which could be 
constructed between A and B which would take each member of set A and map it to one 
and only one member of set B such that each member of set B is mapped.  
 To make the point more clear, let us suppose that set A is full of the letters of the 
English alphabet and set B is full of the natural numbers 1 through 26. We could create a 
function which, when given a letter of the alphabet, will output a number. Let’s make the 
function easy to understand and let f(A) = 1, f(B) = 2, and so on, according to typical 
alphabetical order. This function is bijective because each letter is mapped to one and only 
one number and every number (1 - 26) is being picked out by one and only one letter. 
Notice that since we can draw a bijective function from the letters to the numbers, we can 
also create one from the numbers to the letters: most simply, let f’(1) = A, f’(2) = B, and so 
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on. Of course, there is nothing apart from the ease of our understanding which requires that 
we link A and 1, since we could have linked 1 with any letter and vice versa.  
 Isomorphism has frequently been used to explain representation (Van Fraassen 
1980; Brading and Landry 2006). Since theories, on the semantic view, are a group of 
related models, there is a certain sort of structure that each of these models has. Most of 
the time, they are thought of as mathematical models though they need not be only 
mathematical as long as they have a structure. Van Fraassen also identifies what he calls 
“appearances,” which he defines as “the structures which can be described in experimental 
and measurement reports” (1980, 64). So, the appearances are the measurable, observable 
structures which are being represented (the targets of the representation). On van 
Fraassen’s account, a theory will be successfully representational provided that there is an 
isomorphic relationship between the empirical substructures (the sources) and the 
appearances (as targets), and an isomorphic relationship between the theoretical models (as 
sources) and the empirical substructures (as targets). (Or at any rate, this is how he has 
commonly been interpreted (see Ladyman et al. 2011). As described by Mauricio Suárez, 
this isomorphism between the models shows that there is an identity that holds between the 
“relational framework of the structures” of the source and the target (2003, 228). And it is 
this relational framework of structures which is being maintained.  
 So, on the isomorphism view of scientific representation, some scientific theory 
represents some target phenomena in virtue of a bijective mapping between the structures 
of a theory and data, and a bijective mapping between the data and the phenomena. Notice 
that on the isomorphic view, the bijections which account for representation are external 
to the theoretical language. That is to say that the relationship that holds between the theory 
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and the phenomena is not internal to the language in which the theory is presented. This is 
an important feature of this account because it allows for a mapping between very different 
kinds of structures. Presumably the (mainly mathematical) structures of theories are quite 
different from the structures of data models and are certainly very different from the 
structures of the phenomena (because the phenomena are not themselves mathematical 
entities). However, since the functions are external, we can create a function which will 
map these very different types of structures to one another.  
1.2.2. Partial Isomorphism 
 Isomorphism has much to suggest for it, especially when focusing in particular on 
those theories which are expressed mathematically. This is especially true in more 
mathematically-driven fields like physics. It seems that the mathematical models in physics 
are representing the structure that holds between various real world phenomena. For 
example, F=ma represents the way in which certain features of an object (its mass, the rate 
at which it is being accelerated) correspond to other features (its force). However, many 
philosophers (e.g., Cartwright 1983; Cartwright, Shomar, and Suárez 1995) have pointed 
out that there are cases where a theory or model truly represents some phenomena, even 
though there are features of the phenomena which do not have any corresponding structure 
in the theory or model, due to abstraction or idealization. 
 Take a rather simple example, the billiard ball model of a gas (French and Ladyman 
1999). Drawing on Mary Hesse’s (1966) important work on models, French and Ladyman 
argue that there are certain features of the model which are taken to be representative, e.g. 
the mass and the velocity of the billiard balls represent the mass and velocity of gas atoms. 
There are also certain features of the billiard balls which are non-representational, e.g. the 
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colors of the balls. Most importantly, though, as a critique of isomorphism, there are 
typically also some undetermined features of the balls. That is to say, for some of the 
features of the model, it is unknown whether they are representational or not. For a more 
detailed scientific example, see Cartwright, Shomar, and Suárez (1995).  
 To respond to problems of this sort, many (Bueno 1997; French and Ladyman 1999; 
French 2003; Da Costa and French 2003) have argued for partial isomorphism. The basic 
idea is that there are partial structures of a theory for which we can define three sets of 
members for some relation. The first set will be those members which do have the relevant 
relation, the second set will be those members which do not have that relation, and the third 
will be those members for which it is unknown whether or not they have that relation. It is 
possible to think of each of these sets of individuals as being a relation itself (since a 
relation, semantically speaking, is extensionally defined), and so we could draw a bijective 
function between these relations. But, as long as the third relation (the third set of 
individuals for which it was unknown whether or not they had the relation) is not empty, 
then the isomorphism will be only partial because there are some relations for which we 
are unsure whether or not they hold in the target.  
 As a more concrete example, consider the billiard ball and atom example from 
above. In order for there to be a partial isomorphism between the two, we must be able to 
identify two partial structures of each system, i.e. a partial structure of the billiard ball 
model and a partial structure of the gas atoms. Between these partial structures, there must 
be a bijective function which maps relations of the model to relations of the gas-system. 
For example, the velocity of the billiard balls will be mapped to the velocity of respective 
atoms. There must be a second function which maps those non-representational relations 
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of the model to features of the gas-system which are not being represented. For example, a 
non-representative feature of the model, like the color of the billiard balls, will be mapped 
to some feature of the system which is not being represented, like the non-color of the 
atoms. All the same, this will still remain partial because there will be certain relations that 
the model has which are unknown (or undefined) in relationship to the gas-system.  
1.1.3. Homomorphism 
 Homomorphism, defended by Bartels (2006), is more general than isomorphism 
insofar as all isomorphisms are homomorphisms, but not all homomorphisms are 
isomorphisms. Homomorphisms still rely on a function being drawn between two sets, but 
they do not require that the function be bijective; i.e. the function need not be one-to-one 
or onto. So, this means that not every relation and part of the theory must map on to one 
and only one relation or part of the target systems. Additionally, this permits that there be 
parts and relations in the target system which are unmapped. Homomorphisms allow for a 
great deal of flexibility with regard to misrepresentations. 
1.2. Similarity 
 Isomorphism (and the other -morphisms) places a fairly strict requirement on the 
relevant constitutive features of representation, which are on these views structural. But, 
as Giere points out (1988, 80–81), this is often not the relevant relationship. Oftentimes, 
scientists are working with theories or models which are valuable not for their salient 
structural features, but rather for some other reason. For example, when modeling the 
behavior of water flowing through pipes, scientists often model the water as a continuous 
fluid, even though it is actually a collection of discrete molecules (Giere 2004). Here, the 
representational value of the model is not between the structure of the model and the 
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structure of the world (since water is structurally not continuous, but rather a collection of 
discrete molecules). Instead, the relevant representational value comes from a more general 
relationship which holds between the behavior of the modeled and real world systems. 
Giere suggests that what is needed is “a weaker interpretation of the relationship between 
model and real system” (1988, 81). His suggestion is that we explain representation in 
virtue of similarity. On his account a model will represent some real world system insofar 
as it is similar to the real world system. Notice that this is a much weaker account of 
representation than the structural accounts, since similarity includes structural similarities, 
and so encompasses isomorphism, partial isomorphism, and homomorphism.  
 Of course, if we try hard enough, we can notice similarities between any two 
objects. For example, any two material objects are similar at least insofar as they are each 
material. Thus, Giere suggests that an account of scientific representation which appeals to 
similarity requires an “implicit” (or explicit) “specification of relevant respects and 
degrees” (Giere 1988, 81). Respects indicate the relevant parts and ways in which the 
model is taken to be representative. Perhaps it is some dynamical relationship expressed in 
an equation; perhaps it is some physical similarity that exists between some tangible model 
and some target object (e.g. a plastic model of a benzene ring); perhaps it is the way in 
which two parts of a model are able to interact with one another, which shows how two 
objects in the target system might interact (like the relevant behavior of the model of water 
flowing through pipes). The limitations with regard to claims of the respects of similarity 
are limited only by what scientists know or take to be the case about the model and the 
target system. For example, a scientist could not claim that there was a similarity between 
the color of a benzene model and a benzene ring since benzene rings have no color. 
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Similarly, a scientist could not claim that there is similarity between the color of a 
mathematical model and the color of a species of bacteria since a mathematical model does 
not have any color. Notice that it is insufficient to merely specify the respects in which a 
model is similar since similarity can come in degrees. Of course, there is a whole spectrum 
of degrees of similarity on which any particular similarity can fall. A source can be 
anywhere from an extremely vague approximation of its target to being nearly identical to 
its target (what Giere calls “exact” (1988, 93)) and everywhere in between.  
 Giere’s own example is that, “The positions and velocities of the earth and moon 
in the earth-moon system are very close to those of a two-particle Newtonian model with 
an inverse square central force” (1988, 80). Here, the relevant respects are the position and 
velocity of the earth and moon. The relevant degree is that the positions and velocities in 
the earth-moon system are “very close” to the two-particle Newtonian model. These 
respects and degrees thus give us an account of how we should think of the similarity 
between the model and the target system. 
 Giere uses similarity to describe the relationship between models and the real-world 
systems they represent, and sometimes between different models (one model may be a 
generalization of another, and so on). Theories themselves are constituted by a set of these 
models as well as some hypotheses that link the models to the real world which define the 
respect and degree of the similarity between the models and their targets.  
 More recently, Weisberg (2013) has argued for a similarity account of 
representation. In brief, his view argues that two sets of things be distinguished in both 
source and target: the attributes and the mechanisms. In distinguishing these sets, an 
equation can be written in which the common attributes and mechanisms can be thought of 
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as the intersection of the attributes of the model and of the target system, and the 
intersection of the mechanisms of the model and target system. The dissimilarities can also 
be identified in a similar fashion. He adds some terms to these sets which are weighting 
terms and functions. These allow the users to indicate which similarities are more important 
than others. Rewriting the equation as a ratio between similarities and dissimilarities will 
result in a method by which we can make comparative judgments about different models. 
In this way, we will be able to say, for example, that one model is more or less similar than 
another. 
1.3. Critiques of Substantive Accounts 
 While similarity and isomorphism continue to have some support in the 
contemporary literature (especially in modified versions, see below, section 3c), the 
versions described above have faced serious criticisms. One of the most common 
arguments against the substantive views is that they are unable to handle 
misrepresentations (Suárez 2003, 233–35; Frigg 2006, 51). Many models in science do not 
accurately reflect the world, and, in fact, the model is often viewed as particularly useful 
because of (not in spite of) the misrepresentations. Nancy Cartwright (1983) has famously 
argued for a fictional account of modelling and made this case for the laws of physics. 
Others have shown that similar things are true in other scientific domains (Weisberg 
2007a). When the theories are intentionally inaccurate, there will be difficulty in explaining 
the way in which these theories are representational (as scientists and philosophers often 
take them to be), with reference to isomorphism or similarity.  
 Suárez (2003, 235–37) has also argued that both similarity and isomorphism are 
each neither necessary nor sufficient for representation.  Consider first isomorphism. It 
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must be the case that it is not necessary for representation, given that scientists often take 
certain theories to be representative of their real-world targets even though there is no 
isomorphic relationship between the theory and the target system. The same is true of 
similarity. Using his example, suppose that there is an artist painting an ocean view, using 
some blue and green paints. This painting has all sorts of similarities to the ocean view she 
is representing, one of which is that both the painting and the ocean are on the same relative 
side of the moon, are both in her line of vision at time t, share certain colors, etc. But which 
ones are relevant to its being representative and which are more contingent is up to the 
discretion of the agent who takes it to be representative of the ocean view in certain respects 
(as Giere argued). But if this is the case, then it turns out that A represents B if and only if 
A and B are similar in those respects in which A represents B. This ultimately leaves 
representation unexplained. 
 Supposing we can give some account of salience or attention or some other socially-
based response to this first problem (which seems possible), we are left with the problem 
that plenty of salient similarities are non-representational. Suárez makes this point with 
Picasso's Guernica (2003, 236). The bull, crying mother, eye, knife, etc. are all similar to 
certain real-world objects. But the painting is not a representation of these other things. It 
is representing some of the horrible atrocities of Franco.  
 Suárez also argues that both similarity and isomorphism are insufficient for 
representation. Consider the first, similarity. Take any given manufactured item, for 
example, an Acer C720 Chromebook, a computer which is similar to many other computers 
(hundreds of thousands). Notice that the fact of its similarity is insufficient to make it 
represent any of the other computers. Even if we add in Giere’s requirement that there be 
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hypotheses which define the respects and degrees of the similarity, the insufficiency will 
remain. In fact, it seems as though there are hypotheses which define the relevant respects 
and degrees of similarity between the computers: Acer’s engineers and quality control have 
made sure that the production of these computers will result in similar computers. All the 
same, even with these hypotheses which give respects and degrees, we would not want to 
say that any given computer represents the others.   
 The non-sufficiency problem holds for isomorphism as well. Suppose someone 
were to write down some equation which had various constants and variables, and 
expressed certain relationships that held between the parts of the equation. Suppose now 
that, against all odds, this equation turns out to be isomorphic to some real-world system, 
say, that it describes the relationship between rising water temperatures and the 
reproduction rate of some species of fish which is native to mountain streams in the 
Colorado Rockies. To many, it appears to be counterintuitive to think that representations 
could happen accidentally. However, if isomorphism is sufficient for representation, then 
we would have to admit that the randomly composed equation does represent this fish 
species, even if no one ever uses or even recognizes the isomorphic relationship.  
 There are other arguments against these views in general, an important one being 
that they lack the right logical properties. Drawing on the work of Goodman ( 1976), both 
Suárez (2003, 232–33) and Roman Frigg (2006, 54) argue that representation has certain 
logical properties which are not shared by similarity or isomorphism. Representation is 
non-symmetric, so when some A represents B, it does not follow that B represents A. 
Representation is non-transitive: if A represents B and B represents C, it does not follow 
that A represents C. It’s also non-reflexive: A does not represent itself. Since isomorphism 
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is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, and similarity is reflexive and symmetric, they do 
not have the properties required to account for representation.   
 There are replies to these arguments on behalf of the substantive views. First, there 
is a general question about whether or not we are justified in making inferences from 
representation in art to representation in science. As was discussed above, many of the 
criticisms against substantive views draw examples from the domain of art (e.g., Suárez’s 
(2003) uses many examples of paintings and is drawing upon Goodman’s (1976) which 
discusses representation in art). But, it should not be taken as given that what holds in art 
must translate to science. In fact, in many cases, the practices in art seem to be quite 
different from the practices in science. As Bueno and French say, “After all, what do 
paintings—in particular those that are given as counter-examples to our approach, which 
are drawn from abstract art—really have to do with scientific representation?” (2011, 879).  
 Following Anjan Chakravartty (2010), Bueno and French (2011) argue that 
something like similarity or partial isomorphism is, in fact, necessary for successful 
representation in science. If there were no similarity or isomorphism at all, the successful 
use of models “would be nothing short of a miracle” (2011, 885). That is to say, while 
similarity or partial isomorphism might not be the whole story, they are at least part of the 
story. Using the aforementioned example of Picasso’s Guernica, they note that “there has 
to be some partial isomorphism between the marks on the canvass and specific objects in 
the world in order for our understanding of what Guernica represents to get off the ground” 
(2011, 885).  
 Replies have been made to the other arguments as well. Bueno and French (2011) 
argue that their account of partial isomorphism can meet all of the criticisms raised by 
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Suárez (2003) and Frigg (2006). Adam Toon (2012)discusses some of the ways in which 
supporters of a similarity account of representation might respond to criticisms. Bartels 
(2006) defends the homomorphism account against these criticisms.  
2. Deflationary and Pragmatic Views 
 If, as these scholars have argued, these substantive views will not work to explain 
scientific representation, what will? Suárez (Suárez 2015a) argues that what is needed 
instead is a deflationary account. A deflationary account claims “that there is no substantive 
property or relation at stake” (Suárez 2015a, 37) in debates about scientific representation. 
Deflationary accounts are typically marked by a couple of features. First, a deflationary 
account will deny that there are any necessary and sufficient conditions of scientific 
representation, or if there are, they will lack any explanatory value with regard to the nature 
of scientific representation. Second, these accounts will typically view representation as a 
relationship which is deeply tied to scientific practice. As Suárez puts it, “it is impossible, 
on a deflationary account, for the concept of representation in any area of science to be at 
variance with the norms that govern representational practice in that area...representation 
in that area, if anything at all, is nothing but that practice” (Suárez 2015a, 38).  
 Already we can see that these views will be quite different from the substantive 
views. Each of these views was substantive in the sense that they gave necessary and 
sufficient conditions for representation. There was also a distinct way in which these views 
were detached from scientific practice, since whether something was representational had 
little to do with whether or not it was accepted by scientists as representational and more 
to do with the features of the source and target. In each case, it was a relationship that was 
entirely accounted for by features of the theory or model and the target system. As 
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Knuuttila (2005) describes it, these were all dyadic (two-place) accounts insofar as the 
relationship held between only two things. The deflationary accounts take a markedly 
different direction by moving to at least a triadic (three-place) account of representation.  
 In some cases, the views that have developed have followed the general lead of 
many deflationary views in giving a central role to the work of an agent in representation. 
These views do not classify as deflationary, given that they still give necessary and 
sufficient conditions of representation. Given the importance of the role of agents and aims, 
we might call these views pragmatic. Although pragmatic and deflationary views are 
importantly distinct in their aims, they share many common threads and in many cases, the 
views could be reinterpreted as deflationary or pragmatic with little effort. As such, they 
will be grouped together in this section.  
2.1. DDI 
 The earliest deflationary account of representation was RIG Hughes’ DDI Account 
(1997). The DDI Account consists of three parts: denotation, demonstration, and 
interpretation. Denotation is the way in which a model or theory can reference, symbolize, 
or otherwise act as a stand-in for the target system. The sort of denotation being invoked 
by Hughes is broad enough to include the denotation of concrete particulars (e.g. a model 
of the solar system will denote particular planets), the denotation of specific types (e.g. 
Bohr’s theory models not just this hydrogen atom, but all hydrogen atoms), and the 
denotation of a model of some global theory (e.g. this particular model is “represented as 
a quantum system” (Hughes 1997, S331)). In each case, the model denotes something else; 
it stands in for some particular concrete object, some type of theoretical object, or some 
type of dynamical system. 
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 We might think this relationship sufficient for representation, since the fact that 
scientists treat certain objects or parts of models as being stand-ins or symbols for some 
target system seems to answer the question of the relationship between a model and the 
world. Hughes, though, thinks that in order to understand scientific representation, we need 
to examine how it is actually used in scientific practice. This requires additional steps of 
analysis. The second part of Hughes’ DDI Account is demonstration. This is a feature by 
which models “contain resources which enable us to demonstrate the results we are 
interested in” (Hughes 1997, S332). That is, models are typically “representations-as,” 
meaning not only do scientists represent some target object or system, but they also 
represent it in a certain way with certain features made to be salient. The nature of this 
salience is such that it allows users to draw certain types of conclusions and make certain 
predictions, both novel and not. This is demonstration in the sense that the models are the 
vehicles through which (or in which) these insights can be drawn or demonstrated, 
physically, geometrically, mathematically, etc. This requires that they be workable or used 
in certain ways. 
 The final part of the DDI Account is interpretation. It is insufficient that the models 
demonstrate some particular insight. The insight must be interpreted in terms of the target 
system. That is to say, scientists can use the models as vehicles of the demonstration, but 
in doing so, part of the representational process as defended in the DDI Account is that 
scientists interpret the demonstrated insights or results not as features of the model, but 
rather as features which apply to the target system (or at least, the way scientists are 
thinking of the target system). 
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 In summary, with denotation, we are moving in thought from some target system 
to a model. We take a model or its parts to stand in or symbolize some target system or 
object. In demonstration, we use the model as a vehicle to come to certain insights, 
predictions, or results with regard to the relationship that holds internal to the model. It is 
in interpretation that we move from the model back to the world, taking the results or 




 After criticizing the substantive accounts in his (2003), Suárez (2004) developed 
his own account of representation which focused centrally on inference and inferential 
capacities, what he calls an inferential conception of representation. As he describes it 
there, this account involves two parts. The first part is what he calls representational force. 
Representational force is defined as “the capacity of a source to lead a competent and 
informed user to a consideration of the target” (Suárez 2004, 768). Representational force 
can exist for a number of reasons. One way to get representational force is to repeatedly 
use the source as a representation of the target. Another way is in virtue of intended 
representational uses, that is, in virtue of the intention of the creator or author of some 
source viewed within the context of a broader scientific community. Oftentimes, the 
representational force will occur as a combination of the two. It is also a contextual 
property, insofar as it requires that the agent using the source has the relevant contextual 
knowledge to be able to go from the source to the (correct/intended) target.  
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 So, for example, in the upper left-hand corner of my word processor is a little 
blueish square with a smaller white square and a small dark circle inside of it (it is supposed 
to be an image of a floppy disk). This has representational force insofar as it allows me to 
go from the source (the image of the floppy disk) to the target (a means of saving the 
document which I am currently writing). In this case, the representational force exists in 
virtue of both the intended representational uses (the creators of this word processor surely 
intend this symbol to stand in for this activity) as well as repeated uses (I am part of a 
society which has, in the past, repeatedly used an image of a floppy disk to get to this target, 
not only in this program but in many others as well). It is also contextual: someone who 
had never used computers would not have the requisite knowledge to be able to use the 
icon correctly.  
 This is part of the story for Suárez, but in order to have scientific representation 
there must be something more than mere representational force. On his view, scientific 
representations are subject to a sort of objectivity which does not necessarily exist for other 
representations, e.g. the example above of the save icon. The objectivity is not meant to 
indicate that there is somehow an independent representational relationship that exists in 
the world when scientists are engaged in scientific representation. Instead, the objectivity 
is present insofar as representations are constrained in various ways by the relevant features 
of the targets system which is being represented. That is, because there is some real feature 
which scientists are intentionally trying to represent in their scientific models and theories, 
the representation cannot be arbitrary but must respond to these relevant features. So the 
constraints are themselves objective, but this does not commit Suárez to identifying some 
reified relationship that holds between sources and targets.  
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 According to Suárez, if we are going to get this objectivity in representations, we 
must turn to a second feature: the capacity of a source to allow for surrogate reasoning. 
This second feature requires that informed and competent agents be led to draw specific 
inferences regarding the target. These inferences can be the result of “any type of 
reasoning…as long as [the source] is the vehicle of the reasoning that leads an agent to 
draw inferences regarding [the target]” (Suárez 2004, 773). Suárez’s point here is that not 
only does the source lead the agent to the target, but also it leads the agent to think about 
the target in a particular way, coming to particular insights and inferences with respect to 
the source.  
 More recently, Suárez (2010) has argued that this second feature, the capacity for 
surrogate reasoning, typically requires that three things be in place. First, the source must 
have internal structure such that certain relations between parts can be identified and 
examined. Secondly, when examining the parts of the source, scientists must do so in terms 
of the target’s parts. Finally, there must be a set of norms defined by the scientific practice 
which define and limit which inferences are “correct” or intended. It is in virtue of these 
norms of the practice that an agent will be able to draw the relevant and intended inferences, 
making the representation a part of that particular scientific practice. Of course, he takes 
his view to be deflationary, so these are not to be understood as necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the capacity for surrogate reasoning, but rather features which are frequently 
in place.  
 Consider an example of a mathematical model, for example the Lotka-Volterra 
equation. The model is supposed to be representational of predator-prey relationships. Part 
of this is Suárez’s representational force—the fact that competent agents will be lead to 
 
36 
consider predator-prey relationships when considering the source. However, as Suárez 
notes, this is insufficient for scientific representation because in science the terms interact 
in a non-arbitrary way. To account for this, he argues that there is another feature of the 
model, which is the capacity to allow for surrogate reasoning. In this case, that means that 
individuals who examine or manipulate the model in terms of its parts (the multiple 
variables) will be able to draw certain inferences about the nature of real-world interactions 
between predators and prey (the parts of the target system). These insights will occur in 
part due to the nature of the model as well as the norms of scientific practice, which means 
that the inferences will be non-arbitrarily related to the real-world phenomena and will 
afford us to recognize certain specified inferences of scientific interest. 
2.2.2. Contessa 
 Suárez’s inferential account has been further developed by Gabriele Contessa 
(Contessa 2007, 2011). He is explicit in his claim that the interpretational view he is 
defending is not a deflationary account, but is rather a substantive version of the inferential 
account insofar as he takes the account to give necessary and sufficient conditions of 
representation. All the same, the account he defends is clearly pragmatic in nature. 
Contessa begins by noting an important distinction he has drawn from Suárez’s work, that 
of the difference between three types of representation. The first is mere denotation, in 
which some (arbitrarily) chosen sign is taken to stand for some object. He gives the 
example of the logo of the London Underground denoting the actual system of trains and 
tracks.  
 The second sort of representation is what Contessa calls “epistemic representation” 
(2007, 52). An epistemic representation is one which allows surrogate reasoning of the sort 
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described by Suárez. The London Underground logo does not have this feature since no 
one would be able to use it to figure out how to navigate. A map of the London 
Underground, on the other hand, would have this feature insofar as it could be used by an 
agent to draw these sorts of inferences.  
 The final sort of representation is what he calls “faithful epistemic representation” 
(Contessa 2007, 54–55). Whether or not a representation is faithful is a matter of degree, 
so something will be a completely faithful epistemic representation provided all of the valid 
inferences which can be drawn about the target using the source as a vehicle will also be 
sound. Notice this does not require that a model user be able to draw every possible 
inference about the target, but rather that the inferences licensed by the map that are drawn 
will be sound inferences (both following from the source and true of the target). In this 
sense, a map of the London Underground produced yesterday will be more faithful than 
one produced in the 1930s.  
 Using this framework, Contessa goes on to describe a scientific model as an 
epistemic representation of features of particular target systems (2007, 56). The scientific 
model will be representational for a user when she interprets the source in terms of the 
target. He remains open to there being multiple sorts of interpretation which are relevant, 
but suggests that the most common sort of interpretation is “analytic,” which functions 
quite similarly to an isomorphism in which every part and relation of the source is 
interpreted as denoting one and only one part and relation in the target (and all of the 
target’s parts and relations are denoted by some part or relation from the source).  
 Of course, given that this is determined by the agent’s use, it is not necessary that 
the agent believe that her interpretation is actually the case about the system. Here is where 
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Contessa draws on the distinction of faithfulness. Since models are often 
misrepresentations and idealizations as has been discussed above, they need not be 
completely faithful in order to be useful. This is not the end of the story, though, because 
the circumstances also play an important role in understanding whether or not something 
is a scientific representation.  
2.3. Agent-Based Versions of Substantive Accounts 
 In light of some of the insights of Suárez and others, many of the views described 
above as substantive views were altered and updated to more explicitly and centrally make 
reference to the role of an agent, making them what could be called agent-centered 
approaches. Of most importance, given their role in the substantive views as described 
above are recent advances made by van Fraassen and Giere.  
2.3.1. Agent-Based Isomorphism 
 The view of isomorphism commonly attributed to van Fraassen, which was 
described above, was the one drawn from his book, The Scientific Image (1980). More 
recently, van Fraassen has presented an altered account of representation, which places 
much more emphasis on the role of an agent (2008). Van Fraassen notes that while some 
reference to an agent was a part of his earlier views (Ladyman et al. 2011), Suárez’s 
important work on deflationary accounts was influential in the development of the view he 
defends (Van Fraassen 2008, 7).  
 He begins his account by looking primarily to the way in which a representation is 
used, saying that a source’s being representative of some target “depends largely, and 
sometimes only” on the way in which the source is being used (2008, 23). Though he does 
not take himself to be offering any substantive theory of representation, he does call this 
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the Hauptsatz or primary claim of his account of representation: “There is no representation 
except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent things thus and 
so” (Van Fraassen 2008, 23). Van Fraassen notices that this places some restrictions on 
what can possibly be representational. Mental images are limited, because they are not 
made or used in some way. That is to say, we do not give our mental states representational 
roles. Similarly, there is no such thing as a representation produced naturally. What it is to 
be a representation is to be taken or used as a representation, and this is not something that 
happens spontaneously without the influence of an agent.  
 Van Fraassen also notices an important distinction in two ways of representing: 
representation of and representation as. When scientists take or use some source to be 
representational, they take it to be a representation of some target. This target can change 
based on context, and sometimes scientists might not even use the source to be a 
representation at all. Consider van Fraassen’s example: we can use a graph to represent the 
growth of bacterial colonies under certain conditions, and so the graph will be a 
representation of bacterial growth (2008, 27). But we could also use that graph to represent 
other phenomena, perhaps the acceleration of an object as it is dropped from some height. 
Part of what this captures is the way in which our perspectives can change the way in which 
we are representing a particular appearance. Thus, by using a source in some distinct way, 
we can represent some particular appearance of some particular phenomena.  
 In intentionally using a source as a representation, scientists do not only make it a 
representation of something, but they also represent it in a certain light, making certain 
features salient. This is what van Fraassen calls representation as. Two representations can 
be of the same target, but might represent that target as something different. Van Fraassen 
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offers an example: everything that has a heart also has a kidney, but representing some 
organism as having a heart does not mean the same thing as representing it as has having 
kidneys (2008, 27). Similarly, we might represent the growth of bacteria mentioned above 
as an example of a certain sort of growth model or as the worsening of some infection as it 
is seen as part of a disease process.  
 Of course, all of this is very general, which van Fraassen acknowledges. However, 
in a true deflationary attitude, he notices that there is no good way of getting more specific 
about scientific representation since it has “variable polyadicity: for every such 
specification we add there will be another one” (2008, 29). Nonetheless, he still maintains 
that the link between a good or useful representation and phenomena requires a similarity 
in structure. As it stands, then, there is still an appeal to isomorphism present in his account: 
“A model can (be used to) represent a given phenomenon accurately only if it has a 
substructure isomorphic to that phenomenon” (2008, 309). Just as before, we have an 
account of representation which relies on isomorphism between the structure of the 
theoretical models and the (structure of) the phenomena. All the same, this is still a 
markedly different view from his earlier view described above. No longer is it the 
isomorphism or structural relationship alone which is representational. Now, on van 
Fraassen’s views, it is the fact that a scientific community uses it or takes it to be 
representational.  
2.3.2. Agent-Based Similarity 
 Ian Hacking (1983) has famously argued that, in philosophical discussions of the 
role and activity of science, too much emphasis is put on representation. Instead, he 
suggests that much of what is done in science is intervening, and this concept of 
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intervention is key to understanding the reality with which science is engaged. All the 
same, he still thinks that science can and does represent. Representation, on his account, is 
a human activity which exhibits itself in a number of different styles. It is people who make 
representations, and typically, they do so in terms of a likeness, which he takes to be a basic 
concept. Representation in terms of likeness, he thinks, is essential to being human, and he 
even speculates that it may have played a role in development like many think language 
did. In creating a likeness, though, he argues that there is no analyzable relation being 
made. Instead, “[likeness] creates the terms in a relation…First there is representation, and 
then there is ‘real’” (Hacking 1983, 139). Representation on his view is not interested in 
being true or false, since the representation precedes the real.  
 Giere (2004, 2010) has also made pragmatics more central and explicit to his 
account of scientific representation. He claims that in attempting to understand 
representation in science we should not begin with some independent two-place 
relationship, which substantially exists in the world. Instead, we should begin with the 
activity of representing. If we are going to view this activity as a relationship, it will have 
more than two places. He proposes a four-place relation: “S uses X to represent W for 
purposes P” (2004, 743). Here, S will be some agent broadly construed, such that it could 
be some individual scientist, or less specifically some group of scientists. X is any 
representational object, including models, graphs, words, photographs, computational 
models, and theories. W is some aspect or feature of the world and P are the aims and goals 
of the representational activity; i.e. the reasons why the scientist is using the source to 
represent the target. Giere identifies a number of different potential purposes of 
representation. These include things like learning what something is actually like, but are 
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fairly contextual and depend upon the question being asked. So the way in which something 
is modeled might change depending on the purposes of the representation (2004, 749–50).  
 Giere is still working from what should be considered a semantic conception of 
theories, in which a theory is a set of models which are created according to a set of 
principles and certain specific conditions. The principles are what we might otherwise think 
of as being empirical laws, but he does not conceive of them as having empirical truth. 
Instead, by thinking of them as principles by which scientists can form models, it is these 
scientists who construct and use the models who make particular the otherwise general and 
idealized principles. On this view, then, it is the models which are representational and will 
link up to the empirical world. 
 There are many ways a scientist can use a model to represent the world, on Giere’s 
view, but the most important way remains similarity. Giere is quick to note that this does 
not mean that we need to think of the representational relationship as some objective or 
substantive relationship in the world. Instead, the scientist who uses the model does the 
representing and she will often do this in virtue of picking out certain salient features of a 
model which are similar to the target system. In doing so, the scientist specifies the relevant 
aspects and degrees of similarity which she is using in her act of representation. 
 One of the advantages of this updated version of the similarity view is the wide 
range of models which can be effectively representational on this account (Giere 2010). 
Giere gives an example of a time when he saw a nuclear physicist treat a pencil as a model 
of a beam of protons, explaining how the beam could be polarized. It is in virtue of the 
invoked similarity between the pencil and a beam of photons, i.e. the fact that the physicist 
specifically used a relevant similarity, that he was able to use it to represent the beam of 
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photons. By noting the importance of the role of the agent, Giere is better able to explain 
the scientific representation which occurs in the whole range of scientific representations. 
 A similar yet importantly distinct account of representation as similarity is defended 
by Paul Teller (2001). Teller argues that we should abandon what he calls the ‘perfect 
model’ model, in which we take scientists to model in a way that is perfectly correspondent 
with the real world targets. Instead, he thinks that models are rarely, if ever, perfect matches 
for their targets. This does not mean that models are not representations. He argues that 
models represent their targets in virtue of similarity, though he denies that any general 
account of similarity can be given. What makes something a similarity depends deeply 
upon the circumstances at hand including the interests of the model user.  
2.4. Gricean 
 One way to ‘deflate’ the problem of scientific representation is to claim that there 
is no special problem for scientific representation, and instead argue that we should 
understand the question of scientific representation as part of the already widely discussed 
literature on representation in general. This is the project taken up by Craig Callender and 
Jonathan Cohen (2006). According to their view, representation in many different fields 
(art, science, language, etc.) can be explained by more fundamental representations, which 
are common to each of the fields.  
 To explain this, they appeal to what they call “General Griceanism”, which takes 
its general framework from the insights of Paul Grice. On their General Gricean view, the 
representational nature of scientific objects will be explained in terms of something more 
fundamentally representational. The more fundamentally representational objects in this 
case are mental states. This, in effect, pushes the hard philosophical problem back a stage, 
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since some account must be given with regard to the representational nature of mental 
states. They remain uncommitted to any particular account of the representational nature 
of mental states, leaving that something to be argued about in philosophy of mind. All the 
same, they mention a few popular candidates: functional role theories, informational 
theories, and teleological theories.  
 There are, on their view, significant advantages to taking this General Gricean 
viewpoint. For one, it has a certain sort of simplicity to it. By explaining all representation 
in terms of the fundamental representations of mental states, we do not need to give wildly 
different explanations as to why a scientific model represents its target and why, for 
example, a green light represents ‘go’ to a driver. Each occurs because, in virtue of what 
the scientist or “hearer” knows, a certain mental state will be activated which contains with 
it the relevant representational content.  
 They can also explain the reasons why similarity or isomorphism will be commonly 
used (though non-necessary) since these are strong pragmatic tools in helping to better 
bring about the relevant mental state with its representational content. This is, as they argue, 
clearly one of the reasons why people from Michigan use an upturned left hand to help 
them explain the relative location of their hometown--because the upturned left hand is 
similar in shape to the shape of Michigan. The reasons why similarity is a useful tool here 
are identical to the reasons why similarity would be useful in scientific contexts, because 
it will make the relative instance of communication more effective--meaning that the hearer 
(or user of a model or scientific representation) will be better able to arrive at the relevant 
mental states which represent the target system. 
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 In short, their view is that while there might be a general philosophical problem of 
representation, there is not anything special about scientific practice that makes its stake in 
this problem any different from any other field or the general problem. Of course, as they 
amusingly note, this passes the buck to the more fundamental question: “Once one has paid 
the admittedly hefty one-time fee of supplying a metaphysics of representation for mental 
states, further instances of representation become extremely cheap” (Callender and Cohen 
2006, 71).  
2.5.Critiques of Deflationary/Pragmatic Accounts 
 These deflationary and pragmatic accounts of representation have not avoided 
criticisms of their own. Many of these criticisms are presented as part of the defense of one 
of the views over another. For example, Contessa (2011) argues against a purely 
denotational account of scientific representation, such as the one seen in Callendar and 
Cohen’s ( 2006). As he says, “Whereas denotation seems to be a necessary condition for 
epistemic representation, it does not, however, seem to be a sufficient condition” (Contessa 
2011, 125). As Contessa argues, it is insufficient merely to be able to stipulate a 
denotational relationship to have the sort of representation which is useful to scientists. For 
example, we might use any given equation (e.g. F=ma) to denote the relationship which 
holds between the size of predator and prey populations. But, while this equation could 
successfully denote this relationship, it will not be of much use to scientists because they 
will not be able to draw many insights about the predator-prey relationship. Therefore, 
Contessa argues, while denotation is a necessary condition of representation, it cannot 
alone be the whole story. In addition, he suggests the need for interpretation in terms of the 
target, as described above.  
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 Matthias Frisch (Frisch 2015, 296–304) has raised a worry which he addressed 
specifically to van Fraassen’s (2008) account, but which is applicable to many of the 
pragmatic and deflationary accounts described above. The worry is that if we take van 
Fraassen’s Hauptsatz (“There is no representation except in the sense that some things are 
used, made, or taken, to represent things thus and so” (Van Fraassen 2008, 23)) literally, 
then it seems to be impossible that some models can represent. Taking Frisch’s example, 
say we wanted to construct a quantum mechanical model of a macroscopic body of water. 
To do this, “we would have to solve the Schrödinger equation for on the order of 1025 
variables—something that is simply impossible to do in practice” (Frisch 2015, 297). But 
if this is so, then it turns out that that the Schrödinger equation cannot be used to represent 
a macroscopic body of water—since we could never use the equation in this way, it is not 
representational in this way. Notice that this concern applies to other pragmatic and 
deflationary accounts: if we are unable to make inferences or interpret the source in terms 
of the target (which, given the complexity here, it seems we would not be able to do), then 
it will also fail to be representational on these other accounts. But this leads to a fairly 
strong conclusion that we can only use a model to represent a system once we have actually 
applied the model to that system. For example, the Lotka-Volterra model seems to only 
represent those systems for which scientists have used it; it does not represent all predator-
prey relationships, in general. 
 Frisch does not think that this argument is ultimately fatal to the pragmatic accounts 
since he argues that because there are constraints on the use of models which are part of 
the scientific practice, there is a sense in which the Lotka-Volterra model, for example, 
represents all predator-prey relationships (even though it has not yet been used in this way) 
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(Frisch 2015, 301–4). There is no problem in extending models “horizontally,” i.e. to other 
instances which are in the same domain of validity of the model. There is, Frisch argues, a 
problem in extending models “vertically,” i.e. using a model to represent some phenomena 
which is outside the domain of validity. This can be seen in the quantum mechanics 
example from above since we do not have any practice in place to use Schrödinger 
equations to describe macroscopic bodies of water. So, he claims, van Fraassen’s view 
(and, by extension, the other pragmatic and deflationary views) must be committed to an 
anti-foundationalism (a view that the sciences cannot be reduced to one foundational 
theory) that denies that the models of quantum mechanics can adequately represent 
macroscopic phenomena. Of course, the anti-foundationalist commitments might be 
viewed as a desirable feature of these views, rather than a flaw, depending upon other 
commitments.  
 Another important critique which applies more generically to a number of these 
deflationary and pragmatic views comes from Chakravartty (2010). As described above, 
many of those who argue for a deflationary or pragmatic account of representation offer 
their view as an alternative to the substantive accounts. That is to say, they deny that 
scientific representation is adequately described by the substantive accounts and do not 
merely add to these accounts, but rather reject them and offer their deflationary or 
pragmatic account instead. Chakravartty argues that this is a mistaken move. We should 
not think of deflationary or pragmatic accounts as alternatives to the substantive accounts, 
but rather as compliments. On the deflationary or pragmatic accounts, representation 
occurs when inferences can be made about the target in virtue of the source. But, “how, 
one might wonder, could such practices be facilitated successfully, were it not for some 
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sort of similarity between the representation and the thing it represents—is it a miracle?” 
(Chakravartty 2010, 201). That is to say, the very function which proponents of the 
deflationary or pragmatic accounts take to be the central explainer of scientific 
representation seems to require some sort of similarity or isomorphism (Bueno and French 
2011). On Chakravartty’s view, the pragmatic or deflationary accounts go too far in 
eliminating the role for some substantive feature. In doing so, they leave an important part 
of scientific representation behind.  
3. Model-Based Representation 
 The question of scientific representation has received important attention in the 
context of scientific modeling. There is a vast literature on models, and much of it is at 
least tangentially related to the questions of representation. An examination of this 
literature provides an opportunity to see other sorts of insights with regard to representation 
and the relationship between the world and representational objects. 
3.1. Models as Representations (and More) 
 Much of the literature on models focuses on the various roles of models within 
scientific practice, both representational and others. In an influential volume on models, 
Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan (Morgan and Morrison 1999b) use a number of 
examples of models to defend the view that models are partially independent from theories 
and data and function as instruments of scientific investigation. We can learn from models 
due to their representational features. Morrison and Morgan start out by focusing on the 
construction of models. Models, on their account, are constructed by combining and mixing 
a range of disparate elements. Some of the elements will be theoretical and some will be 
empirical, that is, from the data or phenomena. Thus far, this view is mostly in line with 
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what has been discussed in the above sections. What makes models unique in their 
construction is that they often involve other outside elements. These can be stories (ways 
of explaining some unexpected data which are not part of a theory), other times it is a sort 
of structure which is imposed onto the data. These other elements, they argue, give models 
a sort of partial independence or autonomy. This is true even when the outside elements 
are not as obviously present, for example when a model is an idealized, simplified, or 
approximated version of a theory. This independence is crucial if we are to use them to 
help understand both theories and data as we often use them to do.  
 According to Morrison and Morgan, models function like tools or instruments for 
a number of purposes. There are three main classifications of the uses of models. The first 
is in interacting with theories: models can be used to explore a theory or to make usable a 
theory which is otherwise unusable. They can also be used to help understand and explore 
areas for which we do not yet have a theory. Other times, the models are themselves the 
objects of experimentation. The second classification of the use of models is in 
measurement: not only as a way of structuring and presenting measurements, but they can 
also function directly as instruments of measurement. Finally, models are useful when 
designing and creating technology. 
 Models are not valuable only insofar as they have these functions. Models, 
Morrison and Morgan argue, are also importantly representational. Their representational 
value relies in part on the way in which they are constructed with both the theory and the 
data or phenomena. Models can represent theories, data, or can be representational 
instruments which mediate between data and theory. Whatever the case, representation, on 
their view, is not taken to be some mirroring or direct correspondence between the model 
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and its representational target. Instead, “a representation is seen as a kind of rendering--a 
partial representation that either abstracts from, or translates into another form, the real 
nature of the system or theory, or one that is capable of embodying on a portion of a 
system” (Morgan and Morrison 1999b, 27). Sometimes models can be used to represent 
non-existent or otherwise inaccessible theories, as they claim is the case with simulations.  
 The final role of models described by Morrison and Morgan is the way that models 
afford the possibility of learning. Sometimes the learning comes in the construction of the 
model. Most frequently, though, we can learn using models by using and manipulating 
them. In doing so, we can learn because the models have the other features already 
described: the wide range of sources for construction, the functions, and their status as 
representations. Oftentimes, the learning takes place internal to the model. In these cases, 
the model serves as what they call a representative rather than a representation. With 
representatives, the insights we can gain from manipulating the model are all about the 
model itself. But in doing so, we come to a place from which we can better understand 
other systems, both real-world systems and other systems. Other times, we take the world 
into the model and then manipulate the world inside the model, as a sort of experiment.  
 Daniela Bailer-Jones (Bailer-Jones 2003, 2009) defends a slightly different but 
related account of the representational nature of models. On her account, models entail 
certain propositions about the target of the model. As propositions, they are subject to being 
true or false. One way of thinking about the representation of models is to say that models 
are representational insofar as their entailed propositions are true. However, this cannot be 
exactly right, since, as was mentioned above, models oftentimes intentionally entail false 
propositions. Since models are about those aspects of a phenomenon which are selected, 
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they will fail to say things about other aspects of a phenomenon. In some cases, the 
propositions entailed may be true for one aspect but false for another. This calls for the role 
of model users who decide what function the model has, the ways in which and degree to 
which the model can be inaccurate, and which aspects of the phenomenon are actually 
representing. In sum, on her view, models are representational in part due to their entailed 
propositions, but also due to the role of the model users.  
 Tarja Knuuttila (2005, 2011) has argued that in thinking about models, too much 
emphasis has been placed on their representational features – even in accounting for their 
epistemic value. Following and expanding on Morrison and Morgan (Morgan and 
Morrison 1999b), she argues that we should think of models as being material epistemic 
artefacts, i.e. “intentionally constructed things that are materialized in some medium and 
used in our epistemic endeavors in a multitude of ways” (Knuuttila 2005, 1266). The key 
to their epistemic functioning is to be found from their constrained and experimental 
nature. Models, according to this account, are constrained by their construction in such a 
way that they make certain scientific problems more accessible, and amenable to a 
systematic treatment. This is one of the main roles of idealizations, simplifications, and 
approximations. On the other hand, the representational means used also impose their own 
constraints on modeling. The representational modes and media through which models are 
constructed (e.g. diagrams, pictures, scale models, symbols, language) all afford and limit 
scientific reasoning in their different ways. When considered in this respect, Knuuttila 
argues, we can see that models have far more than mere representational capacities 
including that they are themselves the targets of experimentation and can be thought of as 




 In addressing model-building Weisberg (2007b) and Godfrey-Smith (2006) both 
take up the idea that the characteristic way in which models are constructed is indirect. 
This comes about in a three step process in which a scientist first constructs a model, then 
analyzes and refines the model, and finally examines the relationship between the model 
and the world (Weisberg 2007b, 209). Models are used and understood by scientists with 
“construals” of the model (Godfrey-Smith 2006). The construal, on Weisberg’s account, is 
made of four parts. The first is an assignment which identifies various parts of the model 
to the phenomena being investigated. The second part of a construal is the scope, which 
tells us which aspects of the phenomena are being modeled. The final two parts of the 
construal are each fidelity criteria. One of these is the dynamical fidelity criteria, which 
identifies a sort of error tolerance of the predictions of the model. The other is the 
representational fidelity criteria, which give standards for understanding whether the model 
gives the right predictions for the right reasons, i.e. whether or not the model is linking up 
to the causal structure which explains the aspects of the phenomenon being modeled.  
 This strategy of model-based science is contrasted with a different sort of strategy, 
what Weisberg calls abstract direct representation. Abstract direct representation is the 
strategy of science in which study of the world is unmediated by models. He gives the 
example of Mendelev’s development of the periodic table of elements. This process did 
not begin with a hypothetical abstract model which is refined and then used 
representationally (as Weisberg thinks the process of model-based science proceeds). 
Instead, this process starts with the phenomena and abstracts away to more general features. 
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Such distinction between modelling and abstract direct representation underlines the 
possibility that not all scientific representations need to achieved in same ways. 
 There are some worries about Weisberg’s understanding of the process of model-
making Through a close examination of the development of the Lotka-Volterra model, 
Knuuttila and Loettgers argue that the process of model-building often begins with certain 
sorts of templates, or characteristic ways of modeling some phenomena, typically adopted 
from other fields. Such already familiar modeling methods and forms offer the modeler a 
sort of scaffolding upon which they can imagine and describe the target system. They also 
argue that another distinct feature of model-making is its outcome-orientation. That is, in 
developing a model, a scientist will typically do so with an eye to the anticipated insights 
or features of the target system that they wish to represent. Thus, on their view, the modeler 
pays close attention to the target system or empirical questions in all stages of the 
development of the model (not just at the end, as Weisberg suggests).  
3.3. Idealization 
 One of the important discussions that has developed primarily in the literature on 
models concerns idealization. Weisberg argues that there are three different kinds of 
idealization, which he generically describes as “the intentional introduction of distortion 
into scientific theories” (2007a, 639). The first kind of idealization he calls Galilean 
idealization. This is the sort of idealization in which a theory or model is intentionally 
distorted so as to make the theory or model simpler, in order to render it computationally 
tractable. This sort of idealization occurs when scientists ignore certain features of a system 
or theory, not because they are playing no role in what actually happens, but rather because 
including them makes the application of the theory or model so complex that they cannot 
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gain traction on the problem. By removing these complexities, scientists distort their model 
(because it lacks complexities which reflect the target). But after gaining some initial 
computational tractability, they can slowly reintroduce the complexities and thus remove 
the distortions.  
 The second type of idealization is what Weisberg calls minimalist idealization. In 
a minimalist idealization, the only features that are carried into the model or theory are 
those causal features which make a difference to the outcomes. So, if some feature of a 
target can be left behind without losing predictive power, a minimalist idealization will 
leave that feature behind. As an example, Weisberg notes that when explaining Boyle’s 
law, it is often assumed that there are no collisions between gas molecules. This is, in fact, 
false since collisions between gas molecules are known to take place in low-pressure 
gasses. But, “low pressure gases behave as if there were no collisions” (2007a, 643). So, 
since these collisions do not make any difference to our understanding of this system, 
scientists can (and do) leave this fact behind.  
 Notice that this is distinct from Galilean idealization insofar as minimalist 
idealizations leave certain features out of their theories or models because they make no 
difference to the relevant tasks or goals at hand. Galilean idealization, on the other hand, 
leaves certain features out even when they do make a difference, simply because leaving 
them in would make the model more complex and less tractable. 
 The final sort of idealization described by Weisberg is what he calls multiple-
models idealization. This is the practice of using a number of different, often incompatible 
models to represent or understand some phenomenon. In this case, none of the models by 
itself is capable of accurately modeling the relevant target system. All the same, each of 
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the models is good at representing certain features of the target system. Thus, by using not 
just a single model but rather this group of models, each of which is distorted, scientists 
can get a better sense of the target system. Weisberg offers a helpful example: the National 
Weather Service uses a number of different models in making its weather forecasts. Each 
of the models used represents the target in a different way, each being inaccurate in some 
way or another. It is the use of all of these models that permits forecasts of higher accuracy 
since attempts to make a single model have resulted in less accurate predictions.  
4. Sociology of Science 
4.1.Representation and Scientific Practice 
 Many important insights on the nature of scientific representation have come not 
from the philosophy of science but rather from thinkers who would typically be considered 
part of the field of sociology of science. The insights from this field can serve as both a 
source of insight on the nature of representation in scientific practice, as well as a challenge 
to the primarily epistemically-oriented insights from the philosophy of science. Michael 
Lynch and Steve Woolgar (1990) edited an important collection of papers on scientific 
representation in practice written from the perspective of sociology of science. More 
recently, Lynch and Woolgar edited another collection with Catelijne Coopmans and Janet 
Vertesi (Coopmans et al. 2014). Treating representation from the perspective of sociology 
of science involves asking a different sort of question than the one so far addressed in this 
article. Instead of asking about the constitution of scientific representation, sociologists of 
science are more interested in a different question, “What do the participants, in this case, 
treat as representation?” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 11).  In the introduction to this volume, 
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Lynch and Woolgar provide a general overview of some of the important insights from this 
perspective.  
 Since sociology of science treats scientific practice as its object of inquiry, it is keen 
to describe precisely how representations are actually used by scientists. They note the 
importance of “the heterogeneity of representational order” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 2). 
That is, there is a wide range of devices which are representational as well as a wide range 
of ways in which the representations are used and in which they are useful. Importantly, 
sociologists are often interested in discussing more than merely the epistemic or 
informational role and use of representations, viewing them as significantly social, 
contextualized, and otherwise embedded in a complex set of activities and practices. 
Sociologists of science attempt to pay attention to the whole gamut of representations and 
representational uses to better understand precisely the role they play within scientific 
investigation.  
 Another important insight, Lynch and Woolgar note, is that the relation between 
representations is not to be thought of as directional in the sense that the representations 
move from or towards some “originary reality” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 8). Instead, any 
directionality of representations is to be thought of as “movement of an assembly line” 
(Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 8). That is to say, representational practice must be seen as 
constructing not only a representation, but also (re)constructing a phenomenon in a way so 
that it can be represented. This is something that can be seen in much of the literature from 
sociologists of science, including the work of Latour as I describe in greater detail below.  
 In paying close attention to the way representations are actually used, some 
sociologists of science note settings in which “discrepancies between representations of 
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practice and the practices using (and composing) such representations” (Lynch and 
Woolgar 1990, 9). These discrepancies and other problems encountered in the actual 
practice of science allow for improvisation and creativity which can help advance the 
particular domains of which they are a part. Sociologists of science are interested in 
studying this creativity, not only for its productivity in science, but also as an interesting 
phenomenon in its own right. 
4.2. Circulating Reference 
 A particularly telling example of these insights, especially from the philosophical 
point of view, is provided in Bruno Latour’s “Circulating Reference” (Latour 1999). 
Latour’s photo-philosophical case study is based on the work of a group of scientists who 
were examining the relationship between a savannah and forest ecosystem. At the end of 
their project, they collectively published a paper on their findings which included a figure 
of the interaction between the ecosystems, detailing the change in soil composition among 
other features. Latour asks how it is that this abstract drawing, which takes a perspective 
no individual could possibly have had and which ignores so many of the features of the 
ecosystem, can be about that stretch of land. That is to say, here we have a drawing, 
something made by ink and paper, and there we have the forest-savannah ecosystem, how 
is it that the former can be about the latter?  
 Latour’s method of answer, which takes the form of a strikingly well-written case 
study in which he presents pictures from the expedition which he uses to structure and 
represent the process he describes, is to look carefully at all the details and steps by which 
the scientists got from the expedition to the figure in the paper. What happens, says Latour, 
is that there are a series of steps through which the scientists abstract from the world in 
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some intentional fashion. In doing so, they maintain some relevant feature of the world, 
but they are simultaneously constructing the phenomena they are studying. In the process 
the representations produced are also getting more abstract.  
 An example will make this clearer. At one stage in the process, soil samples are 
collected from a vertical stretch of ground. These samples are transferred into a device 
which allows the whole vertical stretch of earth to be viewed synoptically. In taking the 
sample, the scientist has already begun to construct--already this particular bit of dirt is 
taken to be representative of the dirt for a much wider area of land. Once the soil has been 
collected, various features of the soil are maintained through intentional actions on the part 
of the scientist. For example, the scientists will label the soil as being of a certain sort of 
consistency. The scientists then use a clever device in which there are pinholes in a tool 
which has the various Munsell colors and numbers, which is itself a construction with a 
long history. In looking through the pinholes, the scientist can abstract away from the dirt 
sample itself, taking, in some sense, only the color (which is done in virtue of a construction 
of numbers associated with particular colors). Something has clearly been lost, namely, the 
full materiality of the dirt. But something has also been gained, in this case, a number which 
corresponds to the color of the dirt; some usable, manipulatable data.  
 Latour’s essay carefully describes many of these transitions from the savannah-
forest system to the published figure. As he claims, it is this series of transitions (which 
each involve abstraction and construction due to the intentional decisions of a scientist) 
which ensures that the figure at the end references or represents the savannah-forest system. 
There is not a single gap between the figure and the world which must be accounted for by 
some representational relation. Instead, on his account, there is a large series of gaps, each 
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of which is crossed by a scientist's actions in abstracting and maintaining, constructing and 
discovering. This series, he thinks, can be extended infinitely in either direction. By 
abstracting further from the already quite-abstract figure, certain hypotheses might be 
suggested, which would result in a return to the savannah-forest system, to gather data 
which might be more basic than the data already gathered. On his view, there is no such 
thing as “the world” which is the most basic thing-in-itself; nor is there any most-abstracted 
element.  
4.3. Critiques of Sociology of Science 
 While these insights from the sociology of science literature have been both sources 
of support and criticism for the philosophical literature, they have also been subject to 
criticisms. One important criticism comes from Giere’s (1994) review of Lynch and 
Woolgar’s (1990) Representation in Scientific Practice. Giere’s primary target is the 
extremely constructivist nature of the sociology of science literature. The constructivist 
approach claims that science is socially constructed: i.e., science is filled with socially-
dependent knowledge and aimed at understanding socially-constructed objects. There is no 
such thing, on this view, of a non-constructed world to be understood by scientists, and 
therefore, no such world to be represented. The attempt to explain representation in this 
framework results in a “no representation theory of representation” (Giere 1994, 115). But, 
Giere thinks there is a straightforward counter-slogan to a view of this sort: “no 
representation without representation” (1994, 115). That is to say that if there is nothing 
‘out there’ in the world being represented, it cannot be that this is an instance of 
representation. This is not to reject the importance of paying attention to the role of the 
practices and representational devices in particular case studies. All the same, Giere argues 
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that if we want a general account of scientific representation, “we must also go beyond the 
historical cases” ( 1994, 119). Put otherwise, the sociology of science perspective is an 
important part of explaining scientific representation, but this work by itself leaves 
representation unexplained. 
 Knuuttila (2014) takes up a similar line of criticism. While she places great 
importance on the insights of sociologists of science, she thinks that many of their views 
have developed with a false target in mind. Many sociologists of science place their views 
as a contrast to a traditional philosophical view of science as something which perfectly 
represents the world. The alternative, they suggest, is their constructivist approach, as 
described above. However, Knuuttila argues, this motivation runs into a few problems. 
First, when they select certain practices to investigate rather than others, by what criterion 
are they distinguishing this practice as representational? In doing so, they seem to be 
relying on some traditional account of representation to delineate the cases of interest. 
Further, it seems that these studies do not show that representation is a defunct concept and 
that we are bound to a purely constructivist account of science. Instead, “these cases 
actually reveal…what a complicated phenomenon scientific representation is…and give us 
clues as to how, through the laborious art of representing, scientists are seeking and gaining 
new knowledge” (Knuuttila 2014, 304). We need not think that just because there is not 
perfect representation of the world, that there is therefore no world to be represented. Their 
insights could equally contribute to an intermediate view in which we reject this perfect-
representation view of science, but still maintain that science is giving us knowledge of the 
real world. That is, we can simultaneously deny that representations “are some kind of 
transparent imprints of reality with a single determinable relationship to their targets” while 
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still affirming that the “artificial features of scientific representations…result from well-
motivated epistemic strategies that in fact enable scientists to know more about their 




THERE IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC 
REPRESENTATION4
1. Introduction 
According to many philosophers of science, representation in scientific practice is different 
from representation in other disciplines, like art and language. This claim is denied by 
Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen ( 2006), who argue that representation is the same 
across disciplines. In this paper, I will argue that their view leaves the communal nature of 
scientific representation unexplained. To explain how scientific representation is 
dependent upon practice, I will introduce the concept of licensing, in which the targets of 
representational vehicles are determined through various activities performed by scientists 
in accord with broader scientific practice. I will argue that licensure is a constitutive feature 
of representation in science, indicating that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
2. Callender and Cohen’s View 
 On Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, much of the literature on scientific 
representation has been “concerned with non-issues” (2006, 27).5 Specifically, they think 
there is no reason for philosophers of science to give a special account of the “constitution 
                                                             
4 Boesch, B. (2017) There is a special problem of scientific representation. Philosophy of Science, 
84(December 2017): 970-981. DOI: 10.1086/693989. Reprinted here with permission of publisher.  
5 Romina Zuppone (2014) argues in favor of Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, suggesting that there are 
normative but not substantive or constitutive differences in representation between art and science.  
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question:” “What constitutes the representational relation between a model and the world?” 
(Callender and Cohen 2006, 68). In response to this question, they make a few 
observations. One is that it is “economical and natural to explain some types of 
representation in terms of other, more basic types of representation” (Callender and Cohen 
2006, 70). They also identify a general desire to have a consistent account of how “entities 
other than models—language, pictures, mental states, and so on—…represent the very 
same targets that models represent”  (Callender and Cohen 2006, 71). For these reasons, 
they suggest that “scientific representation is just one more special case of derivative 
representation” (Callender and Cohen 2006, 75). That is to say that the representational 
nature of scientific vehicles is explained in the same way that the representational nature 
of linguistic entities, artwork, etc. is explained. In each case, and in every practice, the 
representational nature in question will be reduced to a more fundamental representational 
entity. So, e.g., the representational nature of a word, a painting, and a scientific model will 
each be explained in terms of the representational nature of mental states.  
On Callender and Cohen’s view, representation is purely stipulative: “virtually 
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually 
anything…” (2006, 74). Of course, it is not the case that any stipulated representation will 
actually be useful for scientific aims. Thus, they identify pragmatic constraints which 
delimit scientific representation. However, they make it quite clear that these constraints 
are delimiting already-existing representations. As such, the pragmatic constraints are not 
a part of an account of the constitution of representation itself: “the questions about the 
utility of these representational vehicles are questions about the pragmatics of things that 
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are representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status per se” 
(Callender and Cohen 2006, 75). 
 If Callender and Cohen are correct, then we are left rethinking a rather extensive 
literature on scientific representation which typically begins with the assumption that there 
is something special about representation in science.6 As one example among many, 
Mauricio Suárez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. His 
account takes careful notice of the aims of scientific practice, noting that mere stipulation 
(what he calls “representational force”) is insufficient for representation in science. To be 
a scientific representation, a vehicle must also permit surrogate reasoning which “allows 
competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding [a target]” (Suárez 
2004, 773). If we accept Callender and Cohen’s view, then Suárez’s account and the many 
others like it do nothing more than identify some of the typical pragmatic strategies 
employed in delimiting representations for scientific uses (Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).  
3. Private Reminiscence and Communal Representation 
 In order to show that the extensive literature on scientific representation has not 
been addressing a non-issue, I will need to show that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation, a feature unexplained by Callender and Cohen’s account. I submit that the 
relevant feature in need of special explanation is the communal nature of scientific 
representation, that it inherently involves reference to the practice. To see why Callender 
and Cohen’s view is unable to account for the communal nature of scientific representation, 
                                                             
6 For more accounts which answer the constitution question in a distinctive way, see the work of, e.g., Ronald 
Giere (1988, 2004, 2010), Bas van Fraassen (1980, 2008), R.I.G. Hughes (1997), Steven French, James 
Ladyman, and Otávio Bueno (Bueno 1997; French and Ladyman 1999; French 2003; Bueno and French 
2011), and Gabriele Contessa (Contessa 2007, 2011). For an overview of these accounts of scientific 
representation among others, see Brandon Boesch (2015), Mauricio Suárez (Suárez 2015b), and Roman Frigg 
and James Nguyen (2016).  
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consider what I call ‘reminiscence’, a representational relationship which lacks the same 
communal feature. It is defined schematically as the following:7 
Some X is reminiscent of some Y for some agent A provided that when A 
thinks about or experiences X, she thinks about or experiences Y and 
attributes some connection between X and Y.  
So, for example, a drawing can be reminiscent of my nephew, the smell of jasmine can be 
reminiscent of golfing, and so on.  
 There are three noteworthy features of reminiscence. First, the representational 
nature of reminiscence can be reduced to the representational nature of more fundamental 
entities. For example, I can explain the drawing’s reminiscence of my nephew in virtue of 
the mental state produced by the drawing (which is about my nephew, who created it). 
Second, stipulation is sufficient to create an instance of reminiscence. For example, I could 
draw a symbol on my hand which I create for the sake of reminding me to call my nephew. 
The reminiscent relationship between the symbol and my nephew exists because of my 
stipulative act.  Finally, any limitations of reminiscent relationships will be made for 
pragmatic reasons. For example, it would be for pragmatic reasons that I make the symbol 
on my hand look like the ball from his favorite sport since it will more easily remind me 
of him.  
 These three features of reminiscence are noteworthy because they are shared by 
Callender and Cohen’s view of scientific representation. In fact, from Callender and 
Cohen’s perspective, the only major difference between the two concepts would be the 
particular aims for which each relationship is utilized. While important, these different 
                                                             
7 I should note that the account of reminiscence here is not meant as a detailed explanation of this concept, 
but only as an analogy to draw a point about representation.  
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aims alone are insufficient to explain a key dissimilarity between scientific representation 
and reminiscence: while reminiscence can be private, scientific representation is 
necessarily communal. That reminiscence can be private can be seen from the fact that 
discussions of reminiscence can terminate in disagreement. For example, no one is 
ultimately ‘correct’ about whether or not a drawing is reminiscent of my nephew. This is 
because reminiscence is agent-relative and so depends only upon some particular agent and 
her mental states.  
 Scientific representation relies on much more. As Suárez has argued, 
“representation is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular agent. It is rather ‘in the world’, 
and more particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried 
out by those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” 
(2010, 99). Scientific representation is not isolated from the practice in which it is 
embedded. It is necessarily communal.8  The communal nature is demonstrated from the 
fact that representational vehicles demonstrate autonomy from individual scientists and 
their mental states.9 For example, a scientist’s rogue stipulation that the Lotka-Volterra 
model (which represents predator-prey relations) represents population change due to 
genetic drift does not count as an instance of scientific representation. This is not only 
because it does not (pragmatically) allow for meaningful insights, but also because it 
ignores and discounts the autonomous elements of the model as understood and developed 
                                                             
8 The view of representation argued for in this paper echoes many of the points made by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s in his ‘Private Language Argument’ where he argues that meaning is necessarily communal 
(Wittgenstein 2009, 95e-111e).  
9 A similar point about the autonomy of models (from both theory and the world) has been made by Morrison 
and Morgan (Morgan and Morrison 1999b). Here, I am extending a related point to other representational 
vehicles, including things like diagrams and figures, arguing that they are autonomous from individual 
scientists’ mental states.  
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by the broader scientific community.10 The autonomous elements are seen in the materiality 
or historicity of the representational vehicle; in its development, reception, and 
contemporary use. Understanding how and why the scientific object represents its target 
requires paying attention to these communal features.11 That is to say that the communal 
features are partially constitutive of the representational relationship. Callender and 
Cohen’s account of scientific representation does not sufficiently account for these 
constitutive communal elements, as will be shown more explicitly below. 
4. Licensing 
 Explaining the communal nature of scientific representation requires that attention 
be given to the material, autonomous dimensions of the representational vehicle in terms 
of its development, reception, and use. All of these features partially establish a scientific 
representation, through an activity I call licensing. Licensing is the set of activities of 
scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational relationship between a 
vehicle and its target. It is through licensing that scientists and the broader scientific 
community establish what Suárez calls the “intended representational uses” of a vehicle 
(2004, 768). Licensing is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship: 
it plays a critical role in explaining how and why some vehicle represents its target. Seeing 
the sorts of activities involved in licensing and how they partially constitute the 
representational relationship will require that we pay close attention to the historical 
development, reception, and use of actual instances of scientific representations.  
                                                             
10 Of course, there may be disagreements and developments internal to the practice about how to use some 
representation, but these disagreements and developments are part of the practice.  
11 According to Bruno Latour, the peculiarities of scientific image-making (which include the communal 




4.1 Licensing in Artistic Representation 
A similar sort of licensing is present in representation in art, and so an initial pass 
on the concept as it applies to artistic practice will be of use in drawing an analogy to 
licensing in science.12 To see the role of licensing in artistic representation, consider an 
example. The mere stipulation that Pablo Picasso’s Guernica should represent the pain of 
cyberbullying is clearly insufficient to make it represent this target. Understanding how 
Guernica is representational involves an awareness of communal features: Picasso’s 
intentions within the environment in which he created the painting, how the painting was 
received by viewers in the years following its creation, and how it is understood today. 
With these features in mind, it is clear that Guernica represents the pain and suffering of 
the people of Guernica who had been bombed by axis forces at the request of Francisco 
Franco and the Spanish Nationalists. The licensing here is a constitutive element of 
Guernica’s representational nature: without these features, it is not clear whether or how 
the painting would manage to represent anything at all. 
 Licensing also occurs outside of the scope of authorial intent, when the artistic 
community comes to accept that a piece of art is representational in a way that was not 
intended by the author. A good example can be taken from an anecdote related by the 
author Flannery O’Connor: [A] student asked me…: “Miss O’Connor, what is the 
significance of the Misfit’s hat?” Of course, I had no idea the Misfit’s hat was significant, 
but finally I managed to say, “Its significance is to cover his head” (1988, 853). The Misfit 
is a key character in O’Connor’s famous short story, “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” and, 
                                                             
12 It is somewhat contentious to draw conclusions about the nature of representation in science by appeal to 
art; see e.g. Bueno and French (2011). Nonetheless, it is a common technique in discussions of scientific 
representation; see e.g. Suárez (2004). 
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as such, it would not be surprising for his wardrobe to be importantly representational. Her 
answer indicates that while she did not intend any representational target for the hat, there 
may yet be one. If the hat is representational, it will not be due to her authorial intent, but 
rather due to the views of the broader artistic community. 
 Let me make it very clear that the licensure so far described is not already accounted 
for by elements of Callender and Cohen’s account. First, notice that none of these means 
of licensing is a mere pragmatic limitation of already existing representations. It is not as 
if Guernica represents anything and everything, but is then limited by the contexts of 
Picasso, audiences, and art historians. These contexts are a crucial part of understanding 
why it represents at all. Nor is the licensing mere stipulation. O’Connor leaves it open that 
there may be a representational target for the Misfit’s hat, even though she did not stipulate 
one. A single reader’s stipulation alone is insufficient to make it a representation, since the 
target must also fit well with the Misfit’s characteristics, with O’Connor’s general themes 
as understood by literary critics and audiences alike, and so on. Once again, these contexts 
are a critical part of establishing the representational nature of the hat. 
4.2 Licensing in Scientific Representation: A Case Study 
 The unique aims of science indicate that the licensing of scientific representation is 
of a different kind than the licensing in art. All the same, licensing similarly plays a critical 
role in establishing scientific representation. According to Tarja Knuuttila, case studies of 
scientific representation have revealed that it is “a complicated phenomenon” and “a 
laborious art” (2014, 304).  Understanding the nature of licensing and its role in the 
complexities of scientific representation will be best accomplished by examining the 
complicated features seen in the context of a case study. Examples could be made of any 
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type of representational vehicle, like the masterful case study of a scientific figure made 
by Bruno Latour (1999).  I will take as my example the Lotka-Volterra model, since its 
development exhibits interesting features, many of which have already been widely 
discussed by other philosophers (e.g. Knuuttila and Loettgers 2012, 2016).  
 As mentioned above, the Lotka-Volterra model is used by ecologists to represent 
predator-prey relations. It had its beginnings in the independent work of two different 
scientists, Vito Volterra and Alfred Lotka. In understanding the representational nature of 
this model, it is important to pay attention to its licensing through its historical 
development. This attention includes noticing things like the way that the construction of 
the model by Lotka, Volterra, and others has been responsive to certain theoretical and 
empirical aims. These historical and practice-centered features of the model’s development 
reveal the partial autonomy of its representational nature. These features make up the 
licensing which is itself partially constitutive of the representational nature of the model 
since understanding how and why the model represents its targets requires attending to 
these features. Let us now turn to examine these features in more detail. 
 Consider first the development of the model by Volterra, who was “motivated by 
the goal of reproducing the kind of oscillating behavior that was observed empirically in 
fishery statistics” (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, 19). His aim to address a theoretical 
question with an empirically useful model is central not only to understanding how the 
model historically came about, but in understanding how it represents its targets. Consider 
how Volterra described his project and the aims which permeate his description: “Let us 
seek to express in words the way the phenomenon proceeds roughly: afterwards let us 
translate these words into mathematical language. This leads to the formulation of 
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differential equations. If then we allow ourselves to be guided by the methods of analysis 
we are led much farther than the language and ordinary reasoning would be able to carry 
us and can formulate precise mathematical laws. These do not contradict the results of 
observation. Rather the most important of these seems in perfect accord with the statistical 
results” (Volterra 1928, 5). 
Volterra’s actual process of moving from words, to equation, to application of 
results (for both theoretical and empirical purposes) first involved creating an equation to 
account for the population change of a single species. He then added additional species and 
modelled interactions under different conditions, including, notably, contending for the 
same food and the predation of one species upon the other. Using these models, he 
demonstrated “three fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species living 
together” (1928, 20). He then applied these theoretical laws of predator-prey relations to 
the empirical case which had prompted his analysis, the peculiar rise in predator 
populations during the decrease of fishing of prey populations in the Adriatic Sea during 
World War I (1928, 21).  
Why does Volterra’s model represent these theoretical features of predator-prey 
relations? Why does it represent the populations of fish in the Adriatic during World War 
I? It represents these targets because, through a series of steps of analysis, revision, and 
development, each of which was responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims 
understood and described in his account, Volterra established this representational nature. 
Indeed, as explained by Knuuttila and Loettgers (2016), the historical development of this 
model has a much more extended history than the one Volterra described in the two papers 
in which he first introduced it (1926, 1928). The model is a representation of its target not 
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by mere stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but through careful and attentive construction 
of equations which ensure that the model functions in the wider theoretical contexts and 
can explain the relevant empirical aims. In short, the model represents its targets because 
Volterra so licensed it by building into the model these external, autonomous 
representational features. Without these features, how or what would it represent? 
Consider another instance of licensing in the development of the Lotka-Volterra 
model, this time by Lotka. His development proceeded with a different aim than Volterra: 
“instead of starting from the different simple cases and generalizing from them, he 
developed a highly abstract and general model template that could be applied in modelling 
various kinds of systems” (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, 13). He began by creating a very 
general equation which described “evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among 
the several components…of the system” (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, 15). In two papers 
(1920a, 1920b), Lotka applied this general equation to particular cases in biology and 
chemistry, in each case coming to theoretical conclusions about the systems in question. 
For example, in applying the equation to a predator-prey system, he concluded that there 
would be “undamped oscillation continuing indefinitely” among the two populations 
(Lotka 1920a, 414). Lotka did not specifically apply the results to any empirical data, but 
instead used his results to come to theoretical conclusions about these relationships which 
he then connected to theoretical ecological principles drawn from Herbert Spencer’s First 
Principles (1920a, 414).  
 Why does Lotka’s model represent its theoretical target? What constitutes this 
representational relationship? Any attempt to explain the representational relationship must 
reference the way in which Lotka derived his general equation and the way in which he 
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applies it to the specific cases. That is to say, the representational nature of the model is 
constructed through the scientific activities performed by Lotka during the development of 
the model. Lotka does not merely stipulate that his model targets predator-prey 
relationships. Instead, he builds this ability into the model during the development of the 
general equation and further constructs this ability in his application of the question to 
specific targets. In so doing, he partially constructs the representational nature of the 
model—he licenses it as a representation through activities in accord with the broader 
practice. 
 The Lotka-Volterra model’s history since its initial development is long and 
complex. As such, the licensing of the model goes beyond the initial work of Lotka and 
Volterra—similar to how the licensing of O’Connor’s story goes beyond her initial work. 
As described by Alan Berryman (1992), one development was a shift in the 1940s to the 
use of a logistic formulation which allowed for attention to be placed on predator-prey 
ratios rather than products. Another development, which occurred around the same time, 
was the use of a predator functional response which introduced a nonlinear rate of death 
for the prey. Each of these developments license new representational targets by expanding 
and altering the model to make it responsive to different theoretical or empirical aims, by 
removing idealizations, or otherwise by allowing for different theoretical conclusions. 
Many other variations of the Lotka-Volterra model exist, licensed by similar developments. 
As just one example, Richard Goodwin (1967) modified the model to apply to questions in 
economics. Additionally, the original formulation of the model is still used in introductory 
textbooks on ecology (see, e.g., Cain, Bowman, and Hacker 2008). The representational 
nature of the model in each of these cases is partially established by these features of the 
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model which stand independent of any mental states of scientists and students alike. 
Scientists do not merely start using a model however they would like, without recourse to 
the history of the use of the model. There are autonomous elements of the model which are 
carried with it when it changes contexts in virtue of how it was originally developed and 
how the broader scientific practice has come to use and understand it over time (Knuuttila 
and Loettgers 2014). In short, the constitution of the representational nature of the Lotka-
Volterra model relies deeply upon these historical features of licensing as understood by 
the broader scientific community.  
Let me briefly underscore the importance of these activities of licensing to the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model by imagining a scenario in which these 
features are absent. Suppose that Volterra and Lotka had proceeded differently. Suppose 
that they began, for no particular reason, by drawing a five-pointed star and stipulated that 
it represented predator-prey relations. What is the status of this star, qua representation? It 
is not as if the star really is a scientific representation, albeit a bad one, of predator-prey 
relations. Rather, the star plainly fails to be a scientific representation at all. Indeed, Yann 
Giraud’s (2014) study of the Laffer Curve in economics reveals that bad scientific 
representations still include significant elements of what I have called licensing. Scientific 
representations, good and bad, are all constructed to assist in answering certain questions, 
explaining certain phenomena, and understanding certain target systems. It is through 
licensing that scientists and the broader scientific community build into and around the 
vehicle the features and interpretations capable of achieving these aims. A vehicle without 
licensing lacks these features and interpretations. As such, it is not just a bad representation; 
indeed, it is not a representation at all. A discussion of the representational nature of 
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vehicles which lack these features is either infelicitous or involves an equivocation of the 
word ‘representation.’ A view of scientific representation which equally counts both the 
star and the Lotka-Volterra model as full scientific representations, even if it specifies one 
as good and one as bad, underestimates the role of these historical features of the model. 
They are not external to the representational nature of the vehicle, but are themselves an 
essential constitutive element of its representational nature: without these features, the 
vehicle is not a scientific representation at all.  
5. The Special Problem of Scientific Representation  
 If I am right that licensing is a necessary constitutive feature of scientific 
representation which explains its communal nature, then contrary to Callender and Cohen’s 
suggestion, we cannot pull the question of the constitution of representation away from 
questions of practice. A scientific object represents its target not (only) because there is 
some stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but also in virtue of licensing: the context in 
which it was created, the application of theoretical and empirical constraints, the awareness 
of and management of idealizations, and the history of its reception and use. Accounting 
for whether and how a scientific object represents its target will always require reference 
to these features which partially establish the representational nature.  Thus, there is a 
special problem of scientific representation.  
 I should note that I am not here arguing for a stronger counter claim to Callender 
and Cohen which says that accounts of the representational nature of mental states are 
without any value to the constitution question of scientific representation. But my argument 
does indicate that an account of the representational nature of mental states alone is 
insufficient to account for scientific representation. Put otherwise: even if tomorrow we 
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had a solid, universally accepted account of the representational nature of mental states, 
we would not yet have a complete account of scientific representation. We would still need 
an account of the deep reliance that it has upon the practice in which it is embedded. Thus, 
while our discussion of the constitution of scientific representation might include reference 
to the representational nature of mental states, it must also include reference to what I have 
described here as the licensing by the practice.  
 A different concern is that the use of the word ‘special’ is a bit deceptive. What I 
have identified here as the ‘special’ problem of scientific representation turns out to be a 
common feature of representation across disciplines, since, for example, I have suggested 
that it holds of artistic representation as well. While it is true that, according to my 
argument, an account of artistic representation will likely take account of licensing as well, 
it does not indicate that it is the same type of licensing in both practices. Indeed, given the 
unique aims that mark off scientific practice, its licensing can reasonably be expected to be 
correspondingly unique. That is to say that understanding, knowing, or explaining the 
empirical world are special aims, and therefore subject to special sorts of licensing. 
Scientific representation remains special because these features merit special attention.  
 We might also wonder whether it is right to continue to discuss scientific 
representation as a whole. If understanding representation in science requires in part that 
we understand the way in which scientists of a practice develop, utilize, and adapt these 
representational devices, then it is at least possible that these activities will be different 
within different domains. For example, the licensure of representations in physics might 
be rather different from that of economics. My suspicion is that, given the common broad 
scale aims of the various domains, we can still say some general things about representation 
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in science as a whole.  Nonetheless, we would do well to pay attention to representation as 
it occurs in these more localized contexts. Moving forward from this conclusion to develop 
further insights about the nature of scientific representation will involve analyzing specific 
representational objects or strategies as they occur in scientific practice, perhaps taking 
hints and clues from in-the-field investigations like those conducted by sociologists of 
science, e.g. those in Lynch and Woolgar (1990), Latour (1999), and Coopmans et al. 
(2014).  
6. Conclusion 
 Though Callender and Cohen’s view remains a formidable approach to the 
constitution question of scientific representation, I have endeavored in this paper to show 
why their account is insufficient, and thus why this question merits continued attention by 
philosophers of science. Representation in science is deeply tied up with the practice in 
which it is embedded. The communal nature of scientific representation can be seen in the 
way that science, as a practice, partially constructs its representations through the activities 
of licensing. The licensing is not the pragmatic limitation of some already existing 
representations, but is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Any 
account of what it is for a scientific object to represent its target will necessarily involve 






THE MEANS-END ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC, 
REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIONS
1. Introduction 
 In the past fifteen years, there has been an increased interest among philosophers 
of science in discussing the nature of representation as it is used within scientific practice 
(Boesch 2015; Suárez 2015b; Frigg and Nguyen 2016a). Over time, a significant number 
of philosophers have shifted their focus away from substantive accounts of scientific 
representation which refer to the features of representational vehicles and their targets and 
instead offer pragmatic accounts of scientific representation which focus more heavily 
upon the actions of users of representational vehicles. Apart from avoiding criticisms 
raised against substantive accounts, pragmatic accounts of scientific representation can 
explain a wide range of representational uses while drawing our attention closer to the 
actual practice of science.  
 Despite these advantages of pragmatic accounts, there has been little said about the 
notions of action, intention, and agency being employed by these accounts. Just as one 
example among many, Ronald Giere argues that representation occurs when “Agents (1) 
intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of world, W; (4) for some purpose, P” 
(2010, 269). Though he uses work in the philosophy of language to help explain the 
communicative nature of representation, he does not analyze the notions of intention or use 
which he employs. Since these agential concepts are playing an important role in his 
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account (and, indeed, in all pragmatic accounts), the lack of analysis of these concepts 
constitutes a significant gap in our understanding of the representational practices of 
science. For this reason, I will turn in this paper to some work within the philosophy of 
action, and in particular to an account of the nature of intentional actions, to better 
understand the nature of scientific, representational actions.  
 Given the broad commitments of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation 
alongside some guiding suggestions offered by the proponents of these accounts, I will 
argue that a suitable account of action can be found in the work of G.E.M. Anscombe 
(Anscombe 2000). She argues that intentional actions are marked off from other actions in 
virtue of the form of the internal means-end structure of the descriptions of the agent’s 
intentional action, which is itself revealed by a particular sort of ‘Why?’ question. After 
briefly describing Anscombe’s account of intentional action, I will argue that 
representational actions in science can be understood and analyzed in virtue of their internal 
means-end structure. What I shall call the Means-End Account of Scientific, 
Representational Actions offers three central features: (I) the final description in the means-
end ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim; (II) that interaction with a vehicle 
distinct from its target stands as an earlier description which is ordered toward the final 
description as means to end; and (III) the means-end structure is licensed by scientific 
practice, in the sense I have previously described (Boesch 2017). After describing each of 
these features in greater detail through an example, I show how the Means-End Account 
can demarcate scientific, representational actions from representational actions in other 
disciplines and from other types of scientific actions. I close by identifying some payoffs 
of the Means-End Account: that it offers the first account of the scientific, representational 
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actions which ground pragmatic accounts of scientific representation and that it identifies 
representation as a form of action which is of use when exploring how representation is 
intertwined with other scientific activities. 
1. From Dyadic to Triadic Accounts of Scientific Representation: A (Brief) History 
 To show explicitly the value of turning to the philosophy of action for this topic, it 
will be of use to first offer a brief characterization of the history of accounts of scientific 
representation. Early accounts of scientific representation were “dyadic” (Knuuttila 2005, 
1261), in which scientific representation was understood as a two-place relationship that 
holds between some vehicle (e.g. a model) and some target system (e.g. a theoretical or 
empirical mechanism). The representational relationship, on dyadic accounts, is explained 
in virtue of some more fundamental relationship that holds between the vehicle and 
target—most commonly offered in terms of a structure-preserving mapping relationship, 
e.g. isomorphism, partial isomorphism, isomorphic embedding, and homomorphism (see, 
e.g., Bartels 2006; French and Ladyman 1999; French 2003; Van Fraassen 1980), or a more 
general relationship of similarity (e.g., Giere 1988)13 Dyadic accounts of scientific 
representation have been subject to several criticisms. As just one example, a prominent 
set of criticisms (Suárez 2003; Frigg 2006) follows the work of Nelson Goodman (1976) 
and argues that both similarity and isomorphism (and other forms of structure-preserving 
mapping relationships) are insufficient accounts of scientific representation, since they do 
not have the same logical features as representation. 
                                                             
13 While van Fraassen and Giere have often been interpreted as holding dyadic accounts of scientific 
representation in the form of isomorphism and similarity in their early work, Suárez (2004, 768) has pointed 
out that they each give importance to the role of a user even in their early work. Van Fraassen agreed with 
Suárez’s assessment, arguing that he always left room for pragmatics, and only makes it more explicit later 
on (Ladyman et al. 2011, 443–44).  
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 Partially due to these criticisms, philosophers of science later began to offer 
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation.14 Pragmatic accounts are “(at least) triadic” 
(Knuuttila 2005, 1261) because their proponents argue that there is an irreducible place for 
the agent in the representational relationship. They argue that “what representations are 
depends on how we use them” (Knuuttila 2011, 266). I have already noted the central role 
for the scientist’s agency, intentions, and use in Giere’s (2010) account. Suárez’s inferential 
conception of scientific representation similarly makes an essential reference to “the 
presence of agents and the purposes of inquiry” (2004, 773). These accounts are far from 
the only ones to give prominence to the agency and use of scientists in offering an account 
of scientific representation (Hughes 1997; Teller 2001; Bailer-Jones 2003; Suárez 2010, 
2015a; Giere 2004; Contessa 2007, 2011; Van Fraassen 2008; Mäki 2009).  
2. Three Ways Forward from Pragmatic Accounts 
 In some ways, the shift toward pragmatic accounts of scientific representation 
makes it difficult to offer any further insights about scientific representation. At least some 
pragmatic accounts of scientific representation deflate the concept of representation 
entirely to use. Deflationary accounts of representation imply that “the analysis of the 
concept of representation, even where feasible, cannot determine its conditions of 
application, and therefore cannot explain its use” (Suárez 2015a, 47). It is unclear what 
further insights can be offered by an account which cannot describe when and how 
representations will be used within scientific practice. Even for those pragmatic accounts 
                                                             
14 Other alternatives to a substantive account include denying that there is any such thing as representation in 
science, suggesting that instead there is a mere family of resemblance of a set of practices (e.g., Lynch and 
Woolgar 1990). Giere (1994) and Knuuttila (2014) criticize this ‘no-representation’ approach. Another 
alternative is to offer an account of representation which applies to all disciplines in which it is found. Craig 
Callender and Jonathan Cohen (Callender and Cohen 2006) make such an argument in terms of internal 
mental states. For a criticism of this account, see my response to their work (Boesch 2017).  
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which maintain substantive elements in addition to a foundation in human actions 
embedded in a practice, there remains a concern that little more can be said about the 
pragmatic grounding of these accounts. As Tarja Knuuttila has put it: “if representation is 
grounded primarily in the specific goals and the representing activity of humans as opposed 
to the properties of the representative vehicle and its target, nothing very substantial can be 
said about it in general” (2009, 144). Nonetheless, there are still several ways forward 
which jointly help to make general progress in better understanding the practice of 
representation within science.  
 One way forward is to begin by acknowledging the essentially pragmatic nature of 
scientific representation, but then turn to examine and describe the more fundamental 
features and relationships which are frequently utilized when scientists represent. These 
more fundamental relationships are what Suárez (2003, 229) calls the “means” of 
representation—while representing scientists take advantage of these features, they are 
alone insufficient to explain the representational relationship. These include things like 
similarity (e.g., Giere 2004, 2010; Weisberg 2013), as well as other structure-preserving 
mapping relationships (Bartels 2006; Bueno and French 2011; Frisch 2015; Van Fraassen 
2008). These studies are insightful and useful in understanding some instances and means 
of representational use since they can help draw our attention to some of the strategies and 
features that scientists use. 
 Another way forward, suggested by Suárez (Suárez 2015a, 47), is to pay more 
attention to the uses of representational vehicles in practice. Practical studies of classes of 
representational vehicles attend not to the more fundamental relationships being utilized in 
representational activities, but to the classes of representational vehicles which scientists 
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construct, revise, and employ. Interesting and insightful studies have been made about 
various classes of vehicles, including models (Morgan and Morrison 1999a; Knuuttila 
2005, 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Weisberg 2007b; Knuuttila and Loettgers 2012, 2014, 
2016) and other representational vehicles like diagrams and figures (e.g. Woody 2004; 
Perini 2005a, 2005b; Sheredos et al. 2013). Similarly, sociologists of science have done 
many useful studies examining the development and employment of some particular 
representational vehicle (e.g., Lynch and Woolgar 1990; Latour 1999; Coopmans et al. 
2014). Studies of representational vehicles are of obvious value to deepening our 
understanding of the uses of scientific representation since they draw our attention to the 
ways in which classes of vehicles or specific instances of representation are utilized within 
practice.  
 There is a third way forward which, so far, has not yet been discussed by 
philosophers of science. It is to pay greater attention to the nature of agency which is central 
to pragmatic accounts of scientific representation and offer an account of scientific, 
representational actions. Many accounts indeed do offer some insight into what sorts of 
actions they have in mind. Van Fraassen, for example, speaks of using, making, and taking 
something as a representation in his famous Hauptsatz or central point about the nature of 
representation (2008, 23). Suárez (2004)(2004) speaks of the surrogate inferences that are 
made with regard to the target system being represented. And Giere (2004, 2010) speaks, 
as I mentioned above, about an agent’s intentions and use. Despite the insights which have 
arisen from these accounts of using, making, taking, inference-making, intending, and so 
on, nothing has been said about the nature of the actions themselves with regard to their 
internal structure. Put differently, what is the nature of the action being performed when a 
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scientist uses, makes, takes (etc.) a vehicle as a representation? What are the features and 
elements that make up the representational use of a vehicle? Taking up such an inquiry 
requires offering and working through an account of the nature of actions, working to apply 
the account to the representational practices in science so as to analyze the nature of 
scientific, representational actions.  
 In this paper, I will follow this third way forward, getting behind the references to 
using, making, taking, and so on to examine the internal structure of scientific, 
representational actions. My argument will speak generally about scientific, 
representational actions as a whole. The generality of my account will leave several 
elements unspecified, since as Knuuttila notes, we must proceed forward from pragmatic 
accounts in a way which leaves room for the “specific goals” taken up in the activity of the 
scientists (2009, 144). The account defended here will leave room for the specific goals a 
scientist might take up by offering a general account of some of the formal, internal features 
of the intentional actions of representing in science. Before I offer and defend an account 
of the nature of scientific, representational actions it will be of use to turn first to some 
work on the nature of intentional actions drawn from philosophers of action.  
3. Desiderata of an Account of Scientific, Representational Actions 
 There are numerous accounts of the nature of agency and intentional actions within 
the philosophy of action. Before diving into the literature in greater detail, it is of use to 
first identify general features of the notion of agency as it is being utilized in pragmatic 
accounts of scientific representation. The most helpful insights are two related claims, one 
negative and one positive, about the relationship between representational use and mental 
states: (1) that representational actions are not explained in terms of internal, individual 
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mental states and (2) that representational actions are to be explained in terms of the wider 
scientific practice.  
 Let us examine these in greater detail. Suárez is explicit in denying that 
“representation is necessarily the property of individuals… [or that] representation is ‘in 
the head’” (Ladyman et al. 2011, 432; c.f. Suárez 2010, 98–99).  If we are to have a truly 
pragmatic account of representation in science, Suárez argues that we must avoid “[a]n 
intentionality conception [of scientific representation which] … takes it that sources and 
targets are determined by some intentional state of some particular agent or agents, 
regardless of community, practice, and indeed any intended or unintended uses” (Ladyman 
et al. 2011, 432). He argues that an account which reduces representation to the singular 
intentions or mental states of some individual misses the important role that the broader 
scientific practice and community plays in scientific representation. Indeed, on Suárez’s 
view, scientific representation is not ‘in the head’ but rather “‘in the world’, and more 
particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by 
those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 
2010, 99).  
 Following Suárez’s work, I have recently argued that scientific representation is 
“necessarily communal” insofar as it “is not isolated from the practice in which it is 
embedded” (Boesch 2017, §3). Scientific representations, I argue, are ‘licensed’, i.e. 
established as representational by the broader scientific practice. Licensing is a complex 
“set of activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational 
relationship between a vehicle and its target” (Boesch 2017, §4) and includes elements like 
“the context in which [the vehicle] was created, the application of theoretical and empirical 
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constraints, the awareness of and management of idealizations, and the history of its 
reception and use” (Boesch 2017, §5). My point is that if you are going to understand how, 
why, and in virtue of what some vehicle is a representation in science, you cannot ignore 
its history, its development, and how it is understood and used by the broader scientific 
practice. Put more directly to the concerns at hand, an account of scientific representation 
must move beyond individual mental states and consider the broader practice in which 
representational actions are embedded. 
4. Anscombe’s Account of Action 
 In selecting an account of action for the purposes at hand, it will be important that 
we follow the suggestions above to identify an account which pays attention to the broader 
circumstances and does not terminate in discussions about mental states. There are 
therefore reasons to shy away from the standard causal account which argues that actions 
are intentional in virtue of being caused by particular sorts of mental states (see, e.g., 
Davidson 2001). Such an account turns our attention inward to mental states, rather than 
outward to the circumstances and society in which an action occurs. Furthermore, the 
relevant mental states occur before the action actually takes place, meaning that “the 
subsequent ‘effects’—i.e., the actual performance or doing, is simply a matter of nature 
taking its course” (Frey 2013, 4). As Harry Frankfurt argues, the causal account thereby 
“direct[s] attention exclusively away from the events whose natures are at issue, and away 
from the times at which they occur” (Frankfurt 1998, 70). Frankfurt’s criticism is 
particularly relevant given that we are attempting to offer an account of scientific, 
representational actions as they occur within the context of scientific practice, not of the 
mental states which precede these actions. As such, we will need a different account of 
 
87 
action which pays closer attention to the actual action itself and which helps to show the 
way in which an action is embedded in a wider practice.  
 G.E.M. Anscombe (Anscombe 2000) developed an account of intentional action 
which agrees with the basic point that actions are not intentional because of private, internal 
mental states. She is quite clear on this point, arguing that “intention is never a performance 
in the mind” (Anscombe 2000, 49). Instead, she argues that an investigation into intention 
must begin with the actions themselves: “The only events to consider are intentional actions 
themselves, and to call an action intentional is to say it is intentional under some description 
that we give (or could give) of it” (Anscombe 2000, 49). Put otherwise, the term 
‘intentional’ does not have reference to a connection to internal mental states, but instead, 
“the term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description of events” (Anscombe 2000, 
84). There is not room to discuss her account in much detail, but a brief overview of a few 
features will be of use in what follows.  
 To understand what Anscombe means by the ‘form of description of events’, we 
must first get clear on a few key concepts. An action, she argues, can be described in several 
accurate ways. Consider a simple action, like when I get a refill on my cup of coffee as a 
reward and encouragement to finish a paper. It can be described as ‘getting a refill,’ ‘tipping 
a coffee pot,’ ‘activating certain neurons, neural regions, and nerves,’ ‘rewarding myself 
for finishing a section on my paper,’ (if there is a crack in my mug) ‘making a mess,’ and 
so on. We can distinguish between these descriptions through the application or non-
application of “a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’” (Anscombe 2000, 84). The 
application or non-application of the ‘Why?’ question can be seen in the coffee refill 
example. Some of these descriptions are such that when asked why I am doing the thing 
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described by that description, I will offer an answer—they are such that I will not refuse 
the ‘Why?’ question. So, for example, if you ask me ‘Why are you getting a refill?,’ I will 
accept the application of the question when I respond, e.g., that I am rewarding myself for 
finishing a section on my paper. However, you may also ask about descriptions to which I 
refuse application of the ‘Why?’ question (Anscombe 2000, 84). For example, if you ask, 
‘Why are you making a mess?” I may deny the application of the question by saying that I 
did not know that I was doing so. Genuine lack of awareness is one way that someone can 
deny the application of the ‘Why?’ question. Others include descriptions of something 
involuntary (e.g. activating certain neurons, since we cannot voluntarily activate specific 
neurons) as well as things which are ‘downstream’ from our action such that we cannot say 
that the agent is doing them now (e.g. getting tenure, since at the end of writing the paper 
I will not have tenure, even though the paper may very well ultimately contribute to my 
getting tenure).  
 Suppose that, in the coffee example, there are three descriptions to which the 
‘Why?’ question applies: (A) ‘Tipping the coffee pot;’ (B) ‘Getting a refill;’ and (C) 
‘Rewarding myself for finishing a section.’ Anscombe argues that these descriptions have 
a unique formal connection to one another which is central to explaining the intentional 
nature of the action. Consider the following series of ‘Why?’ questions and answers: 
 Why are you (A) tipping the coffee pot? 
  (B) To get a refill. 
 Why are you (B) getting a refill? 
  (C) To reward myself for finishing a section.15  
                                                             
15 You could of course ask why I am doing (C). But at a certain point, the answer to this question is too far 
‘downstream,’ as the example of ‘getting tenure’ shows (Anscombe 2000, 38–40). 
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There are two important things to notice about this example. First, Anscombe thinks that it 
is important that (A) is a means to the end of (B), and (B) is a means to the end of (C). That 
is to say that the reason or purpose in tipping the coffee pot is to get a refill, and the reason 
or purpose of getting a refill is to reward my hard work. Second, it is important to notice 
that (A) - (C) are not separate actions, but rather separate descriptions of one and the same 
action. In these contexts and circumstances, with the mug under the coffee pot (which is 
itself full of coffee), tipping the coffee pot is getting a refill, not a step toward getting a 
refill. Similarly, getting a refill is rewarding myself, not a step toward rewarding myself.16 
 We are now in a position to see what Anscombe means when she says that “the 
term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description of events” (Anscombe 2000, 84). 
The form is an internal means-end structure, in which the multiple accepted descriptions 
of one and the same action are ordered as means to ends. So, the intentional nature of an 
action has very little to do with internal mental states and instead has everything to do with 
the structure of the descriptions of the actions—which is itself understood within the 
broader context of the action since the contexts and circumstances (that the mug is under 
the coffee pot, that the coffee pot is full, etc.) are key in making it such that an earlier 
description (e.g. (A) tipping the coffee pot) is the same action as a later description (e.g. 
(B) getting a refill).  
 Furthermore, Anscombe argues that the broader context plays a central role in the 
agent’s practical reasoning which itself reveals “what good, what use, the action is” 
(Anscombe 2005, 114). So, to understand how and why an action is intentional, we must 
                                                             
16 This depends a bit on what I assume the reward to be. I am assuming it is the refill of the mug (and not 
drinking the coffee) because I often count a refill a reward and do not then drink from it. If you find this 
contentious, you can consider Anscombe’s more detailed water pump example (Anscombe 2000, 37) which 
is not subject to the same ambiguities.  
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understand the aims of the action and how the contexts and circumstances connect certain 
descriptions accepted by the agent. So, for example, understanding how refilling coffee 
was intentional involves understanding my aims (rewarding myself), our society (that 
coffee is a desirable drink) and how the circumstances connect the descriptions—that the 
coffee pot is full, that the mug is under the coffee pot, that it is not leaking, and so on, are 
essential conditions to making it such that tipping the coffee pot (in this case) is an instance 
of refilling my mug. 
 So, if we are going to understand the nature of scientific, representational actions 
as intentional actions in the Anscombean sense, we will need to pay careful attention to the 
form of the scientist’s action (the way in which descriptions are ordered as means to ends), 
the aims of the scientist (why she is representing—“what good, what use, the action is” 
(Anscombe 2005, 114)) as well as the circumstances in which she is acting, since these 
play a central role in structuring the form of the action. 
5. The Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational Actions 
 There are two important demarcation projects in offering an account of scientific, 
representational actions. The first is to explain in virtue of what the actions are scientific, 
representational actions, i.e. how they are different from representational actions in other 
contexts. The second demarcation project is to offer an account of how the actions differ 
from other scientific actions, i.e. how the actions are scientific, representational actions. 
Each of these demarcation tasks will be conducted in terms of the “form of description of 
events” (Anscombe 2000, 84). Here, I will offer what I call the Means-End Account of 
Scientific, Representational Actions in which there are three features which hold of the 
form of the action which can jointly address the two demarcation questions and offer 
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insights into the nature of the representational practices in science: (I) the final description 
in the means-end ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim (e.g. scientific explanation, 
prediction, theorizing, etc.); (II) that interaction with a vehicle distinct from its target (e.g. 
a mathematical model, diagram, figure, etc.) stands as an earlier description which is 
ordered toward the final description as means to end; and (III) the means-end structure is 
licensed by scientific practice, as I have previously described (Boesch 2017). 
6.1 Three Features of Scientific, Representational Actions 
 Before describing how these features which hold of the internal means-end 
structure of scientific, representational actions can answer the two demarcation questions 
and offer insights about scientific, representational actions, it will be useful to spend some 
time explaining each of the features and describing them in greater detail. A running 
example will be of use during this stage, so let us consider a scientist who is using a 
mathematical model as a representation of some target system, e.g. a scientist who uses the 
Lotka-Volterra equations to represent the population dynamics of a predator-prey system 
of foxes and rabbits.  What is going on when the scientist uses the equations in this way? 
Like the example of getting a coffee refill above, there are several ways to describe her 
action. She could be described as ‘writing down numbers,’ ‘manipulating an equation,’ 
‘analyzing dynamical features of the equation,’ ‘coming to an understanding of the 
dynamics of populations resulting from predator-prey interactions,’ ‘shaking the table,’ and 
so on. As before, some of these descriptions will be denied the application of Anscombe’s 
‘Why?’ question: for example, perhaps she does not know she is shaking the table and so 
would deny this description of her action. Let us suppose that she accepts three of these 
descriptions of her action, offered in the following imagined series of ‘Why?’ questions 
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and her replies to those questions. As before, the use of the ‘Why?’ question helps to reveal 
how these descriptions are all of one and the same action and ordered as means to ends.  
‘Why are you writing down numbers?’ 
 ‘I am writing the equation in different ways.’  
‘Why are you writing the equation in different ways?’ 
 ‘I want to analyze its dynamical features.’ 
‘Why are you analyzing the equation’s dynamical features?’ 
 ‘I want to understand the population dynamics which result from the foxes’ 
predation upon rabbits.’  
Each representational action will have its own set of descriptions which may vary due to 
user, aim, or vehicle. But, assuming that each case of representational action is an 
intentional action, it will be subject to the same sort of analysis as above. The Means-End 
Account of Scientific, Representational Actions identifies the general features that will 
hold of the action’s internal structure. 
 Using the example, consider the first part of the Means-End Account: (I) the final 
description in the means-end ordering of descriptions is some scientific aim (e.g. scientific 
explanation, prediction, theorizing, etc.).17 In this example, the final description 
(understanding the fox-rabbit population) clearly counts as a scientific aim. Other scientific 
aims include, but are not limited to, things like scientific explanation, experimentation, 
theorization, prediction, alongside nonepistemic aims, including things like mitigation or 
practical implementation (Elliott and McKaughan 2014). I do not mean to offer a full and 
                                                             
17 Note carefully that the multiple describability of actions, on Anscombe’s account means that there are 
many ways to describe any given action, but this does not further imply that either (1) every action has 
multiple aims in its descriptions nor that (2) the descriptions are purely arbitrary. 
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complete list of the potential scientific aims that can be present in scientific, 
representational actions. While the aims are in most cases easily identifiable, the only 
requirement is that the aim be recognized or accepted by the broader scientific community 
as a scientific aim.18 Thus, for example, suppose that the scientist in the example above 
was writing the equation in different ways because she realized that the pencil scratches 
matched the beat of her favorite song. Such an aim is patently non-scientific. The same is 
true if she is writing the equation in different ways as part of a piece of art she is making. 
The final description must be one which her fellow scientists would count as scientific.  
 It is also worthwhile noting that the aims of the scientific, representational action 
also supply a standard of normative evaluation for the action. Insofar as a scientist achieves 
her aims, her representational action can be considered successful. An action might be 
successful with regard to some aims and unsuccessful with regard to others. Given the wide 
range of aims allowed by the Means-End Account, there is room to understand a similarly 
wide range of normative measures of evaluation, including accuracy, predictive success, 
explanatory power, among others. The Means-End Account remains uncommitted to which 
normative standards and measures might apply in any given representational action, except 
that they must be understood in the context of the scientist’s aims. So, certain 
representational actions might take accuracy or correspondence as a normative measure of 
success, likely (though not exclusively) when the goals include knowing, understanding, 
or predicting. Such is the case, for example, with the representational actions involving 
scale-models, e.g. the Mississippi River Basin Model. Accuracy (in at least some respects) 
                                                             
18 I make this point to avoid offering normative restrictions on scientific practice, especially as it changes and 
evolves going forward. I take it that the scientific community at any given stage will be the best judge (even 
if fallible) of what counts as a scientific aim. 
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in the construction and use of the model allows for more useful predictions and a better 
understanding of the dynamics of floods in the Mississippi River Basin. There are other 
cases where accuracy or correspondence will neither be a success or a failure of a 
representational action. Such is the case for models of systems which do not exist—for 
example in attempting to understand the evolution of sex by studying non-existent 
biological species with three sexes (Weisberg 2007b, 223). Here, there is no value to 
correspondence (since there could be no correspondence), though there is a value to 
explanatory power.  
The second feature of scientific, representational actions is (II) that interaction with 
a vehicle distinct from its target (e.g. a mathematical model, diagram, figure, etc.) stands 
as an earlier description which is ordered toward the final description as means to end. In 
the Lotka-Volterra model, there were two earlier descriptions of interaction with the 
vehicle: writing the equation in different ways and analyzing the dynamical features of the 
equation. The relevant sense of ‘interaction’ in the second feature is meant to be left open, 
and includes things like analyzing an equation, writing an equation down, tracing fingers 
along a chart, examining and considering different parts of a diagram, altering variables in 
a simulation, and so on. As was the case with the relevant sense of scientific aims, it is 
important only that the form of interaction be recognizably useful in a scientific context by 
the broader scientific community. Minimally, the scientific community’s recognition will 
involve a reasonable expectation that the form of interaction will accomplish some 
scientific aim. Thus, for example, the scientist’s throwing of a crumpled piece of paper 
with the Lotka-Volterra equations printed on it is not a valid form of scientific interaction 
with the model since it would not help to accomplish any scientific aims. 
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It is important to note that the vehicle with which the scientist interacts must be 
distinct from its target. The purpose of this requirement is to incorporate the idea that 
representation is a non-reflexive relationship, meaning that any given vehicle does not 
represent itself (at least not for representation as it occurs within scientific practice). What 
counts as distinct for the purposes of the Means-End Account includes not only separate 
objects (e.g. a scale model to a river valley, a mathematical equation to a theoretical 
system), but also different perspectives on the same object. For example, interactions with 
a few model organisms (e.g. these three mice) can be used to draw conclusions about the 
broader species or sub-species to which they belong (e.g. Mus musculus or C57BL/6). 
Similarly, interaction with this sample of lead (if it is a representative sample) can be used 
to understand general features about lead as a whole. The distinction in both examples is 
sufficient to meet the requirement as explained by the Means-End Account. 
 The third and final feature of scientific, representational actions is (III) the means-
end structure is licensed by scientific practice, in the sense I have previously described 
(Boesch 2017). As I described above, a representation is licensed through a complex “set 
of activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational 
relationship between a vehicle and its target” (Boesch 2017, §4), including “the context in 
which [the vehicle] was created, the application of theoretical and empirical constraints, 
the awareness of and management of idealizations, and the history of its reception and use” 
(Boesch 2017, §5). Here, I am extending the notion of licensing to include the scientific, 
representational actions which undergird scientific representation. For actions, what 
matters is that the means-end structure itself be licensed; i.e. that the means is an accepted 
form of accomplishing the end. So, in the example above, analyzing the dynamical features 
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of the Lotka-Volterra model is a licensed means of better understanding the relationship 
between predators and prey, including the specific fox-rabbit population at hand. However, 
suppose that the scientist was analyzing the dynamical features of the model but was 
aiming to understand the radioactive decay of some isotope of carbon. In such a case, while 
both her aim and means are scientific, the relationship between the means and the end is 
not licensed by the scientific community since the Lotka-Volterra model is not used to 
represent radioactive decay.19  
 Bruno Latour (1999) has effectively described many of the elements of what I call 
licensing in the construction and development of a diagram. Latour describes in meticulous 
detail the many minute steps by which scientists move and abstract away from the target 
system of forest-savannah interaction in the construction of a diagram which represents 
that system. The task involves, for example, dividing the land into sections, sampling soil, 
describing colors, taking plant samples, and drawing many iterations of the diagram before 
it is completed. The use of the diagram as a means to gaining understanding or creating 
explanation about the forest-savannah system is, on my account, licensed by these many 
activities on the part of scientists which, as Latour so carefully describes, are themselves 
subject to the aims, norms, and theory of scientific practice. The same is true for the 
relationship between other representational vehicles as means and certain aims and goals: 
the mouse, as a model organism, is licensed to allow for certain tentative conclusions to be 
made about the efficacy and safety of human consumption of some pharmaceuticals; the 
Mississippi River model was licensed to make predictions about floods and the mitigation 
                                                             
19 In some cases, representational vehicles will be used in novel ways (e.g. in the transfer of a model between 
disciplines). In such a case, the licensing of the representational action is given through the scientist’s 
application of theoretical and empirical constraints to her action (for more on this point, see Boesch 2017). 
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provided by the implementation of proposed flood-control systems in the river basin; 
Schelling’s model is licensed as a means of providing a potential explanation of the types 
of societal habits which can lead to segregation; and so on and so forth. 
6.2 The Demarcation of Scientific, Representational Actions 
 As identified above, there are two main ways in which scientific, representational 
actions need to be demarcated from other sorts of actions: (1) in virtue of what are they 
scientific, representational actions? and (2) in virtue of what are they scientific, 
representational actions? The Means-End Account addresses each of these demarcation 
questions. 
 Let us consider first what makes these actions scientific. The answer here is to be 
found in all three parts of the Means-End account. Both the action’s aim offered in its final 
description and its means offered in an earlier description must be accepted as scientific by 
the broader scientific community. Furthermore, the connection between the means and the 
end is itself licensed by scientific practice. While representational actions in other 
disciplines (e.g. art) might utilize similar means and similar ends, they nonetheless are 
distinguished in virtue of being part of a different practice, constituted by a different set of 
aims, means, and set of licensing practices (Boesch 2017). On the Means-End Account, an 
action is scientific when it is informed and constrained by the practice of science, much in 
the same way that an action is a viable chess move when it is informed and constrained by 
the rules and practice of the game of chess. Some move, e.g. ‘Castling’, is a chess move in 
virtue of its relationship to the external rules of the game of chess and an understanding of 
its strategies and the practices that have arisen alongside the game. For the same reason, a 
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representational action is scientific in virtue of its relationship to the external practice of 
science.  
 Of course, there are a wide range of scientific actions beyond only representation. 
The Means-End Account must help also to demarcate scientific, representational actions 
from other sorts of scientific actions. The central point of demarcation is that actions 
described by the Means-End Account have denotational form. Denotational form is drawn 
from the notion of denotation, the standing-in of a representational vehicle for its target. 
Nelson Goodman, whose work on representation is often cited in discussions of scientific 
representation, argues that “denotation is the core of representation” (Goodman 1976, 5). 
Several philosophers of science have similarly argued that denotation is an important part 
of an account of scientific representation (Hughes 1997; Elgin 2010; Frigg and Nguyen 
2016b). The Means-End Account does not make reference to a relationship of denotation 
that holds between the vehicle and the target, but rather makes reference to the denotational 
form that holds of the scientist’s action. Denotational form holds when an agent uses some 
vehicle as a stand-in for a target. Formally, this is present when there is one action with at 
least two descriptions (ordered as means to ends) in which the earlier description involves 
interaction with a vehicle and a later description involves the (potential) achievement of 
some end about the target. The Means-End Account describes actions which have 
denotational form, since features (I) and (II) require two different descriptions, one of an 
end to (potentially) achieve some aim about the target and the other of a means of 
interacting with the vehicle (which is distinct from the target found in the end).  
 There are two important caveats to the notion of denotational form. The first is that 
denotation is a non-reflexive relationship. Thus, denotational form must incorporate the 
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non-reflexivity, meaning there must be a distinction between the vehicle in the first 
description and the target in the second. However, as is the case with the Means-End 
Account, even a difference in perspective is sufficient to account for the necessary level of 
distinction (e.g. it is sufficiently distinct if interaction with these three mice allows for 
conclusions to be drawn about Mus musculus as a whole). The second important caveat 
about denotational form is that it relies upon a deflated notion of denotation, what Suárez 
describes as “denotative function” (Suárez 2015a, 44). A vehicle has denotative function 
provided it is the sort of thing which would denote its target, supposing that its target exists. 
The modification to the notion of denotation is useful for an account of scientific 
representation since it helps to explain how it is that vehicles with fictional targets are still 
representations. For the purposes of the Means-End Account, it helps to explain how it is 
that an action can have denotational form, even if the aims involve (potential) achievements 
about a fictional target system.  
 The denotational form of a scientific action demarcates it from other forms of 
scientific action. Non-representational experimentation does involve scientific interaction 
with something and a scientific aim, but it does not have denotational form because it lacks 
distinction between the object of the interaction and the object of the aim. So, for example, 
an experiment designed to identify an unknown chemical lacks denotational form because 
the interaction occurs directly with the unknown chemical. Conclusions about the object 
of interaction (the unknown chemical) are not generalized to be about a broader species, 
but are instead about the unknown chemical itself.  
 Of course, there are plenty of cases of experimentation (and other forms of 
scientific action) which do have denotational form. But this is because representation is 
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deeply intertwined with many different forms of activities in science. As just one example, 
representation is a common element to many types of experimental design. Thus, 
experimental actions which have denotational form have it because the experimental 
method involves representation. So, for example, a public health experiment which uses a 
sample of some population to draw conclusions about the value of some health protocol 
utilizes representation as an essential feature of its design. The experimental design is such 
that the sample population is a representation of the larger population. Indeed, much of the 
work in experimental design in such cases is involved with obtaining a representative 
sample and collecting data which allows the scientists to show others that the sample is a 
meaningful representation of the larger population—both constituting the licensing in such 
a case. The denotational form of the action in this case points to the representational nature 
of the action, even if it is also a form of experimentation. Indeed, as I will discuss below, 
the Means-End Account is useful in helping to identify the ways in which representational 
actions can be brought into and united with other forms of actions in science, even while 
providing the tools by which we can identify what makes a representational action in 
science distinct from a non-representational action.  
 6.3 Payoffs of the Means-End Account 
 Before examining some of the payoffs of the Means-End Account, it is important 
to pause and summarize what the account does and does not do. The Means-End Account 
does not offer an account of the nature of scientific representation. As such, it is not able 
to explain new cases of representation which other accounts could not explain. It begins 
with the assumption that some pragmatic account or group of accounts has already 
provided a good analysis of the nature and use of representation in scientific practice. 
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Following on this assumption, it offers an analysis of a component which has been 
heretofore unexamined: the nature of the actions that undergird and ground representation 
for these accounts. The Means-End Account does not, therefore, explain how some model 
represents its target, though it does explain what it means to say that it is used 
representationally by some agent working in the context of scientific practice. The Means-
End Account offers an account of the actions “carried out by those communities of 
inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 2010, 99).  
 The first payoff of the Means-End Account follows upon the very fact that it 
describes not the nature of scientific representation, but rather the nature of scientific, 
representational actions. Because it takes a different target for its analysis, the Means-End 
Account provides novel insights for our understanding of the important practice of 
representation in science. Whereas pragmatic accounts of scientific representation have 
terminated their discussion of actions by describing using, taking, making, inference-
making, and so on, the Means-End Account gets to a deeper level by offering an analysis 
of the agential concepts from an action-theoretic perspective. It describes the conditions 
which hold of the internal structure of representational actions in science. Such an account 
is useful for a few reasons. One is that it offers a stronger theoretical ground for pragmatic 
accounts of scientific representation, by filling in some of the undescribed details about the 
nature of the agency which grounds these accounts—for example, by explicating the 
relationship between normative standards and the context of use. It can also be of use in 
analyzing instances of representational use associated with particular vehicles and 
particular aims. For example, when analyzing the representational use of some diagram, 
the Means-End Account can be of use in analyzing the representational action, specifically 
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with regard to how the action in this case differs from the scientific and representational 
actions in other cases. Most importantly, though, is that the Means-End Account offers a 
significant step forward in an attempt to gain a more complete grasp of the practice of 
representation within science. A more complete account of the practice of representation 
in science will explain not only the nature of scientific representation, but also the strategies 
and features scientists use (e.g. similarity and other structure-preserving mapping 
relationships), the classes of representational vehicles used and particular case studies, and, 
now, with the Means-End Account, the nature of scientific, representational actions. 
 As I mentioned above, the Means-End Account can be of use in understanding how 
other forms of scientific activities (like experimentation) utilize representation, since it 
points to the way in which representation is deeply intertwined with other scientific 
activities. According to Anscombe, there are two ways we might think of a single action 
with multiple descriptions. One of these recognizes that each description is a full 
characterization of the action and can be used to describe the action as a whole. The 
alternative way of understanding an action with multiple descriptions is to recognize that 
there is a particular eminence to the final term in the series of descriptions. As Anscombe 
says, “the last term we give in such a series…so to speak swallows up all the preceding 
intentions” (Anscombe 2000, 46). So, if we are going to offer one and only one description 
of an action, the most proper description is the final description of the internal means-end 
structure. According to feature (I) of the Means-End Account, all scientific, 
representational actions take as their final description some scientific aim (e.g. explaining, 
understanding, knowing, predicting, etc.). As such, successful instances of scientific 
representation are not merely cases of representation, full stop. Indeed, there is no such 
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thing as successful scientific representation which is not also properly describable as some 
other scientific activity, as an instance of understanding, knowing, explaining, predicting, 
exploring, discovering, and so on. 
 The reason for the intricate connection between representation and other scientific 
activities is connected to the way in which the Means-End Account understands 
representational actions of science in terms of their form. On the Means-End Account, 
representational actions occur when an action best characterized by its final description 
(e.g. explanation, prediction, etc.) meets certain formal requirements regarding the ordering 
of descriptions and the relationship between them. As such, representation takes on an 
‘adverbial’ function within scientific practice: scientists understand representationally, 
explain representationally, discover representationally, experiment representationally, 
and so on. On the Means-End Account, then, representation turns out to be one of the ways 
in which the many types of scientific activities occur.  
 There are a couple of useful consequences to this final insight about scientific, 
representational actions, each of which could be more fruitfully explored in future work. 
For one, it suggests that there may be interesting forms of strategies associated with 
representational forms of certain types of activities. For example, explaining 
representationally might employ certain techniques that discovering representationally 
does not employ (and vice versa).  It is possible, therefore, that studies of representation 
could be classified not in terms of classes of vehicles (e.g. models, simulations, diagrams, 
etc.), but rather in terms of classes of activities (e.g. explaining, understanding, predicting, 
etc.). Saying anything in detail about these differences will require a closer analysis of the 
practices associated with these forms of activity, perhaps including an analysis of case 
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studies. The Means-End Account offers the tools to be able to perform such an analysis 
which will offer insights about a wide range of scientific practices.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have taken seriously the suggestion offered by a wide number of 
philosophers of science in recent years that representation in science must be understood 
in terms of a scientist’s agency, actions, and activities. I argued that in order to have a more 
complete picture of the practice of representation in science, it is important to offer an 
account of scientific, representational actions. Following some guidelines already present 
in the literature on scientific representation, I argued that Anscombe’s account of 
intentional action has the right sorts of features to be able to fit with the other pragmatic 
accounts of scientific representation which have already been offered. Following her 
insight that intentional refers to the form of description of events we give to an action, I 
argued that scientific, representational actions have three features which help to demarcate 
them from other sorts of actions. The Means-End Account of Scientific, Representational 
Actions contributes to a more thorough picture of the practice of scientific representation, 
by offering a novel account of the scientific, representational actions. It also points to the 
potential for future work on the way in which representation is intertwined with other forms 






PRAGMATIC ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION20
1. Introduction 
 Many recent philosophical accounts of scientific representation are pragmatic in 
nature.21  Pragmatic accounts of scientific representation are marked off from other 
accounts because they give an irreducible place within the representational relationship to 
the role of the scientist and her intentional activity. Put otherwise, all pragmatic accounts 
are minimally triadic (Knuuttila 2005) insofar as they reference not only the 
representational ‘vehicle’ (models, equations, diagrams, etc.) and its representational 
‘target’ (real-world systems, data, theoretical objects, etc.), but also include the intentional 
actions or ‘intended use’ activities (Suárez 2004) of a scientist or group of scientists.  
 Pragmatic accounts have much to suggest for themselves qua philosophical 
explanations of scientific representation. For one, they are not subject to the same sorts of 
criticisms that have been levied by Mauricio Suárez (2003) and Roman Frigg (2006) 
against alternative dyadic or two-place accounts (e.g. similarity and isomorphism).22 
Furthermore, both Suárez (2003) and Frigg (2006) argue that pragmatic accounts are better 
                                                             
20 Boesch, B. Pragmatic accounts of scientific representation: A tapestry of explanation. Under review at 
Journal for General Philosophy of Science.  
21 For an overview of the literature on scientific representation, see (Boesch 2015; Suárez 2015b; Frigg and 
Nguyen 2016a). 
22 Defenses of isomorphism or partial isomorphism are given by van Fraassen (1980), French and Ladyman 
(1999), French (2003), Bartels (2006), Bueno and French (2011), among others; defenses of similarity are 
given by Giere (1988) and Weisberg (2013). For a response to the objections of Suárez (2003) and Frigg 
(2006), see Chakravartty (2010), Bueno and French (2011) and Toon (2012).  
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able to deal with intentional misrepresentations, allowing them to better explain the use of 
a wide range of representational devices within the varied domains of scientific practice. 
For this reason, it is not surprising to see so many pragmatic accounts developed and 
defended in recent years, including RIG Hughes’ (1997) DDI account, Mauricio Suárez’s 
(2004) inferential account, among many others (Teller 2001; Bailer-Jones 2003; Giere 
2004, 2010, Contessa 2007, 2011, Knuuttila 2005, 2011; Van Fraassen 2008; Mäki 2009; 
Frisch 2014). 
 What is more surprising is the variation that exists between pragmatic accounts of 
scientific representation. While there appears to be agreement that representation is 
grounded in human action, there is no similar agreement about how this is to be cashed out, 
in terms of the analysis of scientific representation. Within pragmatic accounts of scientific 
representation, we find references to denotation, demonstration, and interpretation (Hughes 
1997), representational force and surrogative reasoning (Suárez 2004), a scientist’s 
intending to use a vehicle to represent the world for certain purposes (Giere 2004), and a 
scientist’s using, making, and taking (Van Fraassen 2008), just to name a few. What are 
we to make of these variations? Do differences in terms represent a difference in analysis 
of representation? Call this puzzle the question of external unity of pragmatic accounts of 
scientific representation.  
 One answer to the question of external unity is to suggest that there is a substantial 
difference between these accounts. That, e.g., reference to denotation, demonstration, and 
interpretation is substantially different from reference to a scientist’s intentions to use a 
vehicle to represent the world for certain purposes. If this is the case, then there would be 
a conflict between the many pragmatic accounts: to accept one would be to reject the others. 
 
107 
For anyone seeking to analyze an instance of scientific representation, much would hang 
upon precisely which account taken. Of course, such a response would help to explain the 
proliferation of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, since, on this 
interpretation, each offers its own distinct view of the representational relationship. All the 
same, it is not clear what the relevant difference is between an account which references a 
scientist’s intending to use a vehicle to represent the world for certain purposes and one 
which references denotation, demonstration, and interpretation.  
  A different answer to the question of external unity, and the one which I will defend 
in this paper, argues that pragmatic accounts are complementary with one another. I will 
argue that the many pragmatic accounts offer a tapestry of explanation through which we 
can understand the complex practice of representation in science. Each account takes up a 
different focus and places stronger emphasis on different elements within the activity of 
representing. In different ways and to different extents, accounts highlight the role of ends 
and aims in representing, or the interaction with the vehicles and their features, or the 
translation that occurs between vehicle and target. Representation in science, I will suggest, 
is a complex and varied practice and cannot be quickly and succinctly understood. Thus, 
the myriad of pragmatic accounts constitutes a tapestry of explanation by which we can 
better understand the nature of representational practice in science through drawing our 
attention to the many important elements of representational activities.  
 To argue that the many pragmatic accounts offer a tapestry of explanation of 
scientific representation, we must turn to understand the nature of the common element 
which undergirds pragmatic accounts: the irreducible reference to the agency of the 
representing scientist. Using an account of the nature of intentional actions offered by 
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G.E.M. Anscombe (2000), I show that any given intentional action can be described in a 
number of ways. The difference in description does not indicate a difference in action, but 
rather a difference in how the action is understood and characterized. A similar point holds 
true for pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. Each offers a different set of 
descriptions of the scientific representation which holds in virtue of the representing 
actions of the scientist. The differences do not indicate a fundamental point of disagreement 
between proponents of pragmatic accounts, but rather demonstrate a difference in form of 
description of the representational relationship which is grounded in their actions. Put 
differently, in any given instance of scientific representation, there is a single 
representational relationship, which holds in virtue of a single representing action. The 
many pragmatic accounts of scientific representation merely offer different 
characterizations of the representing action and the representational relationship that holds 
because of it. 
1.  Two Pragmatic Accounts of Scientific Representation 
 While the analysis that follows is applicable to all accounts of scientific 
representation which are grounded in action, it will be helpful to defend it in terms of 
particular and concrete examples, so as to show specifically how it applies to the accounts 
in question. I will begin by describing two prominent pragmatic accounts: Hughes’ (1997) 
DDI Account and Suárez’s (2004) Inferential Account.  
2.1. Hughes’ DDI Account  
 Hughes’ (1997) DDI account describes scientific representation with reference to 
three features: denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. That is to say that a scientist 
represents by performing an activity in which she denotes, demonstrates, and interprets. 
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The first of these features, denotation, is the way in which a scientist uses a representational 
vehicle as a stand-in for the target system (Hughes 1997, S329-S331). According to 
Hughes, denotation is a broad term meant to include things like the denotation of concrete 
particulars (e.g. a model of the solar system will denote particular planets), the denotation 
of specific types (e.g. Bohr’s theory models not just one hydrogen atom, but all hydrogen 
atoms), and the denotation of a model of some global theory, e.g. this particular model is 
“represented as a quantum system” (Hughes 1997, S331). Common among each type of 
denotation is the notion of ‘standing-in’: in each case, the representational vehicle is 
serving as a stand-in for something else.   
 Denotation or standing-in is insufficient by itself for an account of representation 
in science, since we must also pay attention to the particular ways in which these 
representations are used within the practice to bring about certain results and show how 
these results hold of our target system. The second part of Hughes’ DDI account is 
demonstration, the feature which explains how certain results are brought about (1997, 
S331-S332). In order to allow for demonstrations, it must be the case that representational 
vehicles “contain resources which enable us to demonstrate the results we are interested 
in” (Hughes 1997, S332). So, for example, a physical model of a protein will allow us 
(through manipulation of the parts of the model) to see what sorts of configurations allow 
for connections or separations between the various parts of the model. Similarly, the 
mathematical parts of the Lotka-Volterra model will allow the scientist to identify the 
simple harmonic motion it identifies. Notice that in both cases, the demonstrated results 
are discussed entirely in terms of the model. For Hughes, demonstration occurs when a 
scientist shows that there are certain features which hold of the representational vehicle 
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which allow her to demonstrate results (e.g., make predictions, identify trends, analyze 
connections, and so on) which themselves hold of the representational vehicle itself.  
 Of course, representation in science must not stop with inferences about the 
mathematics (or whatever feature of the representational vehicle). Scientific representation 
must show that the demonstrated results do not hold only of the vehicle, but that they 
connect and inform scientists about the real world or theoretical targets. As such, Hughes 
offers a final element in his DDI model: interpretation (1997, S332-S335). Interpretation 
takes the scientists from the vehicle back and returns her to consideration of the target. In 
interpretation, the demonstrated results (predictions, trends, connections, etc.) are taken to 
hold of the target as well. So, for example, the scientist interprets her results as informing 
her not only of the plastic model of the protein, but about the actual stability of the 
configuration of the protein in the real world. Similarly, the Lotka-Volterra model is 
understood to demonstrate simple harmonic motion not only for the dynamical equation, 
but also for the simple harmonic changes in population sizes for a group of predators and 
prey in virtue of their predator-prey interactions.  
 Before moving on to describe Suárez’s inferential account, it is important to pause 
for just a moment and point out that the three features of the DDI account are understood 
by Hughes as “three activities” (1997, S329). That is to say that Hughes is not ultimately 
describing his account in terms of the features of representational vehicles, but in terms of 
the activities done by scientists. Of course, neither I nor Hughes is suggesting that 
representational vehicles are without important features which offer affordances for the 
activities of denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. All the same, Hughes is clear 
that, for the DDI account, scientific representation is grounded in the activities scientists 
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conduct with the vehicles rather than the features of the vehicles. Scientific representation 
is a practice in which a scientist takes some vehicle to denote some target, demonstrates 
certain results which hold of the vehicle, and finally interprets those results to bear upon 
her understanding (or explanation or knowledge) of the target system.  
2.2. Suárez’s Inferential Account 
The second account which I wish to examine in greater detail is Suárez’s (2004) 
inferential account.23 Suárez understands scientific representation in virtue of two features. 
The first of these features is what he calls representational force, defined as “the capacity 
of a source to lead a competent and informed user to a consideration of the target” (Suárez 
2004, 768).24 Representational force carries with it not only the denotative function, insofar 
as a scientist uses the vehicle as a stand-in for its target, but also an important place for the 
rules and norms of the practice. The need for representational force does not imply that a 
vehicle must serve as a stand-in for anyone who uses the vehicle, but rather for the 
“competent and informed user” (Suárez 2004, 768). All the same, one of the important 
elements of representation in science is the vehicle’s pointing-towards its target, which is 
described by Suárez as representational force. So, for example, the representational force 
of the physical model of the protein points towards the real-world protein (or the theoretical 
structure of that protein). Similarly, the Lotka-Volterra model, when used by a competent 
and informed user, point to the relationship between populations of predators and prey.  
 As Suárez argues, representational force alone will not suffice for representation in 
science. Scientific representation is objective insofar as it is constrained by the aims of 
understanding, explaining, or knowing the target system and by the scientific practice in 
                                                             
23 Suárez offers further details about his inferential account elsewhere (Suárez 2010, 2015a).  
24 N.B. Suárez uses the term ‘source’ where I use the term ‘vehicle’. 
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which the representation is embedded.25 As such, representational vehicles must also have 
the second feature, what Suárez calls “the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning” (2004, 
773). That is to say that when informed and competent scientists use the representational 
vehicle, they will not only be led to consider the target system, but to draw specific sorts 
of inferences with regard to those targets. Suárez is not particular about whether the 
inferences are instances of understanding, or explaining, or knowing, since he argues that 
the relevant sorts of inferences can be the result of “any type of  reasoning…as long as [the 
source] is the vehicle of reasoning that leads an agent to draw inferences regard [the target]” 
(2004, 773). Scientists do not represent because they merely need to be reminded of the 
targets or because they simply need to be led to consider the target system. Scientists 
represent because they want to make inferences about the target—to know more about the 
system, to better explain some causal relationship, to better understand some relationship, 
etc. The capacity to allow for surrogate reasoning captures this important feature of 
scientific representation. So, for example, the physical model of the protein will not only 
direct a scientist to consider the real-world protein, but will also be such that she can draw 
inferences about the stability of some configuration of the real-world protein. Similarly, 
the Lotka-Volterra model does not exist only to help scientists draw predator-prey 
relationships to mind, but also to help them draw specific sorts of inferences and insights 
about that relationship.  
 As was the case with Hughes’ DDI account, it is important to pause for just a 
moment to explain that Suárez also takes his account to describe conditions of the 
representational activities performed by scientists in accord with a practice. Indeed, Suárez 
                                                             
25 For more on the relationship between a representation and the broader community, see (Boesch 2017). 
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has explicitly stated that representational force and the capacity to allow for surrogate 
reasoning are properties of activities: “[W]hen appropriately placed in their context, [the 
two parts] are best understood to appropriately refer to properties of particular activities 
within a normative practice” (Suárez 2015a, 42). According to Suárez’s inferential account, 
scientific representation occurs when a scientist performs activities which have certain 
features: moving from consideration of the vehicle to consideration of the target 
(representational force) and using the vehicle to draw certain inferences about the target 
(the capacity to allow for surrogate reasoning).  
2. A Turn to the Philosophy of Action 
 In order to understand how these and other pragmatic accounts are related to one 
another, we will need to understand the nature of the common feature which unites them: 
the irreducible role of the actions of a scientist. Though other accounts could be used, there 
are advantages to using the account of intentional action offered by G.E.M. Anscombe. 
Most importantly, her account allows us to understand the way in which an action is 
embedded in a practice and denies that we can understand intentional action in terms of 
mental states. These features are central elements of the actions that undergird pragmatic 
accounts of scientific representation, according to Suárez (2010) and my prior work 
(Boesch 2017).   
 Anscombe argues that intentional actions are marked off from non-intentional 
actions because they are those “actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is 
given application” (Anscombe 2000, 9). The relevant sense of the ‘Why?’ question is “that 
in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (Anscombe 2000, 9). So, for 
example, we can ask why an agent is doing some description of her action. If she answers 
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the question positively, she allows application of the question, showing the description to 
be an intentional description of the action. To better understand this, consider Anscombe’s 
famous water pump example: 
A man is pumping water into a cistern which supplies the drinking water of 
a house. Someone has found a way of systematically contaminating the 
source with a deadly cumulative poison whose effects are unnoticeable until 
they can no longer be cured. The house is regularly inhabited by a small 
group of party chiefs, with their immediate families, who are in control of a 
great state; they are engaged in exterminating the Jews and perhaps plan a 
world war.—The man who contaminated the source has calculated that if 
these people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will 
govern well, or even institute the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and secure 
a good life for all the people; and he has revealed the calculation, together 
with the fact about the poison to the man who is pumping. (Anscombe 2000, 
37) 
 
There are, of course, a wide range of descriptions we can give to his action. For example, 
we might say that he is helping to institute a better government, or that he is replenishing 
the water supply, activating certain neural pathways, moving a pump up and down, making 
a rhythm to Queen’s “We Will Rock You”, earning his wage, and so on. Through the use 
of the ‘Why?’ question, we can narrow down the list to consider “all and only his 
intentional actions” (Anscombe 2000, 38).  
 To understand which set of descriptions characterizes the agent’s intentional 
actions, we must first eliminate three general types of descriptions. Each of these types of 
descriptions forms a way in which the agent might reject the ‘Why?’ question. First, there 
are certain descriptions which would not be countenanced by the agent because she lacks 
knowledge or awareness (Anscombe 2000, 11–13). So, for example, if we ask the agent 
why he is making the rhythm to Queen’s “We Will Rock You,” he can deny application of 
the ‘Why?’ question by explaining that he does not know the song. Since the ‘Why?’ 
question does not apply, this is not an intentional description of his intentional action. A 
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second set of descriptions which are denied application of the ‘Why?’ question are those 
which describe an activity which can never be intentional (Anscombe 2000, 11–13). For 
example, the agent might reject the description that he is activating certain neural pathways, 
since this is not the level at which we can control things. The third set of descriptions which 
are excluded from the set of intentional action descriptions are those which are ‘further 
downstream’ from the action at hand. These descriptions occur after what Anscombe calls 
a “break”: the descriptions for which it “is not such that we can now say” that the agent is 
doing the action, e.g. “to save the Jews, to put in the good men, to get the Kingdom of 
Heaven on earth” (Anscombe 2000, 40). This is not a good description of the agent’s 
intentional action, because it is not what the agent is doing. He, of course, aims to do these 
things, and his action may be a vital step in the plan. But in completing the action at hand, 
he will not have accomplished the aim. For our purposes, we need not linger any longer on 
the descriptions which are excluded, except to note that while any given action has a wide 
range of potential valid descriptions, the range is not boundless. It matters what the agent 
knows, what she is capable of controlling, and what she is accomplishing in the action at 
hand.  
 Moving on from the rejected descriptions, we can recognize that an intentional 
action will have some descriptions which the agent will accept as meaningful responses to 
the ‘Why?’ question. For the water pump example, Anscombe suggests that we assume 
that there are four: A) He is “moving his arm up and down”; B) He is “operating the pump”; 
C) He is “replenishing the water supply”; D) He is “poisoning the inhabitants” (Anscombe 
2000, 41). All the same, Anscombe argues that even though there are four separate action 
descriptions, we should not suppose that there are four actions, but rather a single action 
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which can alternatively be described in four different ways: “moving his arm up and down 
with his fingers round the pump handle is, in these circumstances, operating the pump; and, 
in these circumstances, it is replenishing the house water supply; and, in these 
circumstances, it is poisoning the household” (Anscombe 2000, 46). 
 For the purposes of answering the question of the external unity of pragmatic 
accounts of scientific representation, it is important to briefly pause to emphasize that 
descriptions A-D are not the only potential descriptions which could have been offered for 
the agent’s action. Had we so wished, we could have selected four different descriptions 
for the pump example above, e.g., A*) He is pushing and pulling a pump; B*) He is 
drawing water from the ground; C*) He is performing his job; D*) He is committing an act 
of murder. The exact details of the A*-D* descriptions are not particularly important. What 
is important is to note that, A-D are not inherently a better set of descriptions than A*-D*. 
Depending on what you attend to in the action, you can offer a different account of the 
action descriptions present in an intentional action. Put differently, descriptions A-D and 
descriptions A*-D* are equally acceptable means of describing the agent’s actions. 
3. Multiple Describability and External Unity 
 At this stage, we are in a position to be able to put forward an answer to the question 
of external unity of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation. Consider an example 
of the representational use of the Lotka-Volterra model to describe the relationship between 
a population of foxes and rabbits. According to Hughes, the model is a representation 
because its use involves the three activities of denotation, demonstration, and 
interpretation. So, we can imagine a series of hypothetical ‘Why?’ questions asked to the 
scientist which follows Hughes pattern: 
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 Why are you writing down the model? 
  I’m using it as a stand-in for the fox and rabbit populations.  
 Why are you using it as a stand-in? 
  I’m able to manipulate the model to identify mathematical and analytical  
  features of the model. 
 Why are you showing mathematical features of the model? 
  I am interpreting these mathematical features of the model to hold also of  
  the fox-rabbit population.  
The exact nature of the answers might vary, but if they are following the three elements 
Hughes had in mind, we might expect them to be something like the above.  
 The use of Suárez’s Inferential Account will yield a different set of descriptions 
and answers to the series of ‘Why?’ questions. We could imagine interrupting our scientist 
yet again (hoping she is not too annoyed by our question asking), this time asking questions 
and receiving answers with the inferential account in mind: 
 Why are you writing down the model? 
  I’m using it to consider the fox-rabbit system. 
 Why are you considering the fox-rabbit system? 
  I am drawing inferences about their relative population sizes over time.  
As before, the exact descriptions offered with the inferential account in mind may differ.  
 The question of the external unity of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation 
has to do with the relationship that holds between these two ways of describing one and 
the instance of representing action and representational relationship which holds because 
of it. My suggestion is that the differences between the descriptions offered in each account 
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is the same as the difference between descriptions A-D and A*-D* as described above. 
Recall that A-D offered four descriptions of the action of the man at the pump whereas A*-
D* offered for descriptions of the very same action. These differing sets of descriptions, 
A-D and A*-D*, should not be considered as inconsistent and competing accounts of the 
action (indeed, we could imagine the man at the pump to agree to both). Instead, they are 
accounts of the action which emphasize different points and offer a different perspective 
on the very same action. 
 The same is true for the difference of descriptions offered by the DDI account and 
the inferential account. They do not offer accounts of the action which are inconsistent with 
one another; to accept the DDI’s means of understanding the representational use is not 
thereby to deny the inferential conception’s accounting of the representational use (and 
vice versa). Instead, both accounts offer unique perspectives and emphases about the nature 
of the action.  
 Consequently, we can think of the differences between these accounts as making 
salient certain elements of the practice of representation in science. Through the use of two 
examples of representational uses of vehicles, I will discuss the differences in emphases in 
greater detail below. But, as a first pass, we can say that Hughes’ DDI model of scientific 
representation, while it is certainly interested in the whole practice of representation, is 
focused most heavily upon the scientist’s actions qua manipulation of the vehicle. He 
specifically describes the way in which results are demonstrated first and foremost to hold 
of the vehicle, and then interpreted to hold of the target. Suárez’s inferential account seems 
more interested in describing the greater purposes of the representation in making 
inferences about the target system. His account focuses heavily on the inferences drawn 
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about the target system, drawing our attention to the role the inferences may play in 
achieving the aims of the scientist. Whatever the case, it is important to note that the 
difference in emphasis does not imply that the accounts are incompatible with each other. 
The very same instance of representing can be described by each account. And, as I argued 
above, we need not think that one set of descriptions is privileged over the others.  
 We should also note that the compatibility between the accounts does not imply 
that they collapse into one another. The difference in salience in each account provides us 
a different means of understanding the complex practice of representation in science—
some which may be more useful when explaining representation within particular domains 
(e.g. in economics versus in chemistry), as it occurs with particular types of vehicles 
(models versus equations versus diagrams, etc.), or for the sake of particular aims and goals 
(e.g. explanation versus prediction). Indeed, it is for this very reason that my analysis 
provides a positive argument in favor of the plurality of pragmatic accounts of scientific 
representation. The practice of representation in science is “a complex phenomenon” and 
“a laborious art” (Knuuttila 2014, 304). Any single account, while it may offer an account 
of the nature of the representational relationship present in virtue of the representing 
actions, will not be able to sufficiently draw our attention to each of the elements of 
representation and the various strategies which may be employed. It is for this reason that 
the numerous accounts offer us a tapestry of explanation, through which we can better 
understand representational practice (both in general and in particular case studies). There 
is thus good reason to discussion and development of both of these accounts and of others 
(new and old), since, jointly, they can better describe the complex practice of scientific 
representation—across strategies, devices, and disciplines.  
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4. Two Examples 
 To better understand the difference in emphases between the DDI Account and the 
Inferential Account, it will be of use to consider a couple of examples in greater detail. I 
will consider a scale-model and a mathematical equation with a fictional target. By 
examining the analysis provided by each account in terms of the intentional action 
descriptions, we will be able to notice the way in which the DDI Account focuses attention 
on the use of the vehicle and the inferential account focuses our attention on the 
achievement of epistemic aims in representation.  
4.1 Mississippi River Basin Model  
 The Mississippi River Basin Model (MRBM) was a scale model of the Mississippi 
river basin designed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Starting from its semi-
completion in 1949, the MRBM was used by the Army Corps of Engineers to study the 
effects of floods and proposed new flood management systems in the Mississippi River 
Basin for nearly twenty years, most usefully predicting the effects of a flood on the 
Missouri River (a major tributary of the Mississippi River) in 1952 (Foster 1971). The 
model was used representationally in this case among many others. Engineers at the 
MRBM used data collected by engineers in the field to simulate certain conditions of water 
in-flow for the model which allowed the engineers to identify which levees were most 
likely to break or be overtopped, and of these, which could be helped by adding sandbags, 
and which were a lost cause (Foster 1971, 27). The model’s use was successful in 
predicting the various flood stages that were seen at observation points along the Missouri 
River, as well as in strengthening levees or evacuating populations at risk of flooding. In 
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this one case, the MRBM was credited with avoiding nearly 65 million dollars of damage 
(Foster 1971, 27).  
 Depending on which account of the nature of scientific representation you take, you 
might offer different explanations of the representational nature of the MRBM in its use in 
predicting levee damage in the 1952 Missouri River floods. Each of the accounts is 
complementary: to accept the DDI Account of the representational use of the MRBM is 
not to reject the Inferential Account. Each account can draw our attention more closely to 
certain elements of the representational relationship.  
 Hughes’ DDI account offers an analysis in terms of denotation, demonstration, and 
interpretation. In the first place, the DDI Account describes the denotational relationship 
that exists in using the MRBM as a representation of the Mississippi River Basin. The 
denotation is seen best in the way that the MRBM was designed so as to be useful as a 
stand-in for flooding and the effects of flood control systems in the Mississippi River Basin. 
As a map, it is only marginally useful, since its scale (1:100 vertical and 1:2000 horizontal) 
made for a fairly distorted map (Mississippi Basin Model Board 1945). Thus, while the 
MRBM allows individuals familiar with the river system to know what part of that system 
some channel of the model represents, it is not useful as a means of measuring, say, the 
distance between the Ohio river and the Missouri rivers. However, the scale (and many 
other features of the model) were, in fact, designed to denote the flooding effects and stages 
of the Mississippi river basin. Thus, scientists, in their testing associated with the Missouri 
River flooding of 1952 began by taking the relevant portion of the model to stand-in for (a 




 But this was not all they were doing, since it was important for them to be able to 
make meaningful and useful predictions. Thus, they first needed to demonstrate results that 
hold of the model. By using a complex set of instruments for both controlling water inflow 
and measuring water height and outflow rates as a function of time, the engineers were able 
to demonstrate that certain results held of the MRBM itself. That is, they showed that given 
inflow rates of some value, this part of the MRBM became inundated, or this point of 
outflow measurement measured at some new value. But, of course, since they take the 
model as a stand-in of the Mississippi river basin, they do not stop there. The 
demonstrations are taken to hold not only of the MRBM, but also to bear upon the flooding 
in the Missouri River. To do so, engineers would have to understand the results (measured 
in units of minutes and centimeters) as holding of the river basin (interpreted in units of 
days and meters) (Foster 1971, 20–21). They had to notice what results held only of the 
model. Engineers would communicate the meaningful results they gathered to engineers at 
the field offices, who could apply them in the field to put them to use.  
 Using Hughes’ DDI account helps draw our attention to the way in which the model 
was made as a stand-in as well as to the particular things which were performed on the 
model itself. It draws our attention to the manipulability and the interactions with the 
model, showing how an important element of representational practice is the manipulation 
of a vehicle and the collection of results understood entirely in terms of the model itself. 
Measurements at this point are made in terms of the model, with references to the model’s 
grid system and model-type levels of water flow and channel height. But the 
representational action is not complete at this stage. The scientist who stops here, with 
demonstrations only in terms of the model has not represented.  Thus, Hughes’ account 
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also draws our attention to the way that the model results are interpreted and understood in 
terms of the target system. In this case, that draws our attention to the use of scale and the 
conversion that scientists make from model-type levels of water flow and channel height 
to the predicted river-type levels of water flow and channel height.  
 The use of Suárez’s account of scientific representation to analyze the same case is 
not in competition with the account offered by Hughes, though it does offer different 
emphases. First, Suárez’s account describes the representational force of a representational 
vehicle. The representational force exists when a competent scientist is led to consider a 
target when using a source. The consideration here is similar to what was said about the 
demonstration within the DDI Account, though Suárez is more explicit about the role of 
the scientific community in the use of the MRBM as a stand-in. In particular, it matters that 
the engineers using the model understand the way in which the model is useful and the 
ways in which it is not useful. It matters not only that the model was designed to describe 
flooding and flood-control systems of the Mississippi River Basin, but also that the 
engineers using it are aware of this fact and are acting as members of the community.26 
Second, according to Suárez, it is important that surrogate inferences be drawn about the 
target through the use of the model. In the case of the MRBM, we can see how it is that the 
use of the model allows the engineers to draw inferences about the Mississippi River Basin, 
and more specifically about flooding on the Missouri River. The predictions about flood 
stages and knowledge of vulnerable levees came to the engineers not through a direct 
examination of the river or theorization about the same, but through the use of the MRBM.  
                                                             




 As before, Suárez’s account is not in competition with that of Hughes, though there 
are a different set of emphases. Apart from drawing our attention more closely to the 
communal element into the representational activities, Suárez’s account focuses on the 
outcomes of the representational practice. His account draws our attention to the way in 
which representational practice is productive: through the creation of knowledge, 
predictions, and explanations. As such, Suárez’s account invites us to consider the way in 
which aims are present in representational practice, not as an achievement after-the-fact of 
representation, but as part of the activity of representing itself.  
4.2 Hardy-Weinberg Equations 
 There are similar insights with other representational vehicles, even those which 
have a fictional target. Consider, for example, the Hardy-Weinberg equations (Hardy 
1908). The Hardy-Weinberg equations (p+q=1 and p2+2pq+q2=1) are used to describe the 
change in allelic frequency of a population over time and were initially used to show that, 
assuming random mating and a stable population, recessive alleles would not become 
extinct over time. A population is described as being in a state of Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium provided that the allelic frequency of the population is static over consecutive 
generations of a population. Importantly, there are a number of assumptions required to 
reach a state of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Many of these assumptions are fairly 
realistic: for example, that the organisms are diploidic, that organism reproduce only 
sexually, that generations do not mate with one another, and that allele frequencies are 
equal in the sexes. But a number of the underlying assumptions are less realistic, for 
example, that mating is random, that there is no mutation, migration, or selection. One of 
the assumptions is actually impossible: that the population is infinitely large. As such, the 
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use of the equation to represent a population which is at a state of Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium will involve representing a population which could not possibly exist.  
 Let us reverse the order for this example and consider Suárez’s inferential account 
of scientific representation first. His account will explain how a scientist’s use of the 
Hardy-Weinberg equation will allow her to represent a population in a state of equilibrium 
through reference to the two properties of activities. First, the scientist will take it that the 
equations represent an infinitely large population of a diploidic, sexually reproducing 
species (and so on). Importantly, the scientist will understand that it can represent such a 
fictional target because she is an informed user. She is aware of a number of features of the 
equation and its representational force that other, uninformed users would not know; for 
example, that the assumptions reduce any opportunity for selection to occur. Second, the 
scientist will use the equations to draw surrogate inferences about the target. In this case, 
the scientist can show, by calculating the allelic frequency for each generation, that the 
allelic frequency does not change. By violating certain assumptions, she can make 
additional important and insightful inferences about the population which can inform the 
theory of population genetics. For example, she can infer that the allelic frequency of the 
infinite, non-migrating, diploid, sexually-reproducing, randomly-mating, etc. species will 
not change over time. From this, she could—as Hardy originally aimed to show (1908, 
49)—infer that, in the absence of selective pressures, the dominant allele will not take over.  
 To employ Hughes’ account of scientific representation, we must make a minor 
(and friendly) amendment to his account, following a suggestion of Suárez (Suárez 2015a). 
Hughes’ use of the concept of denotation suggests that representation can occur only when 
a target actually exists. Given the fact that scientists often represent fictional targets, it is 
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important to modify his account to allow for such uses. Suárez suggests that instead of a 
discussion of denotation, Hughes should have made reference to the “denotative function” 
of a representational vehicle. A vehicle has denotative function when it is the sort of object 
which would denote its target, provided the target actually exists. I take it that this is a 
friendly amendment to Hughes’ account, given the pragmatic nature of his explanation of 
scientific representation.  
 With this small change in mind, let us consider the representational use of the 
Hardy-Weinberg equations according to Hughes’ account. First, there is the denotative 
function, in which a scientist allows the equations to stand in for the fictional population. 
Second, there is demonstration in which the scientist shows certain features that hold of 
the equation (e.g., that the frequency of p is stable over multiple iterations of the equation). 
Here, the manipulation of the equation is done entirely in terms of the equation, 
demonstrating particular results and insights that hold of the equation itself. Finally, the 
scientist interprets these demonstrated results to hold of the fictional population as well, 
showing that the allelic frequency of the population would hold steady as well.   
 Similar to the example of the MBRM, Suárez’s account draws our attention more 
heavily to the role of the knowledge of the representing scientist (in terms of being 
informed) as well as the aims and goals of the representing scientist, by pointing us to the 
specific inferences she is drawing.  In this case, it allowed us to see the representational 
uses in explaining that the dominant allele would not increase in frequency in the absence 
of selective pressures. Indeed, Suárez’s account can be useful in drawing our attention to 
the way in which a vehicle is constructed for the achievement of particular aims. 
Representational practice is all ordered towards these aims and ends, and the inferential 
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account is useful in making this fact salient across a wide range of examples. As was the 
case with the MRBM, the DDI account draws our attention more closely to the means of 
the representational use, to the way in which the equation itself is used, manipulated, and 
modified, before conclusions are drawn about the target system. We are made to consider 
the successive iterations of the equation that the scientist might write down, one after the 
other, to show the stability in the numbers of p and q. Suárez’s inferential account makes 
such an element less explicit, by drawing our attention more quickly to the aims and end 
results. Hughes’ account makes salient the nitty-gritty work associated with the use of the 
model itself. The role of interpretation also points to another important element of 
representational practice in science, that of translating between the vehicle and its target. 
Hughes does not describe the nature of the translation that occurs, but does draw our 
attention to the importance of such a translation, which is itself the focus of other pragmatic 
accounts of representation (as I describe in greater detail below).  
4.3 Other Accounts 
 It is important to note that the insights mentioned here are not restricted to a 
comparison between Suárez’s and Hughes’ accounts. All pragmatic accounts are subject 
to the same sort of analysis as I have offered and described for these two accounts, in which 
the features they identify are a set of descriptions of the representing actions and the 
representational relationship they undergird. Similarly, each of the accounts will 
demonstrate additional benefits in terms of emphases when explaining particular 
representational uses. Where Suárez’s account draws our attention to the the communal 
nature of the representational relationship as well as the aims and goals of the representing 
and Hughes’ account draws our attention to the manipulation and interaction with the 
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vehicle and points to the role for translation, other accounts will draw our attention more 
closely to other features.  
 Giere’s (2004, 2010) account offers a means of better understanding the translation 
between vehicle and target which Hughes’ account makes salient. Giere’s Agent-Based 
Similarity Account suggests that representation in science is a four-place relationship in 
which some “Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, 
W; (4) for some purpose, P” (2010, 274). He goes on to suggest that similarity is “one way, 
perhaps the most important way, but probably not the only way” that scientists use a model 
to represent the world—it is a feature exploited by scientists in translating from vehicle to 
the world. So, for example, a scientist using the Lotka-Volterra model will exploit the 
similarities that hold between the change in values of variables to the change in values of 
the population of foxes and rabbits. The Army Corps of Engineers used similarities in flow-
rates, channel height, and outflow between the MRBM and flooding on the Mississippi 
River basin to be able to translate between the results demonstrated on the vehicle and 
those which would hold of the river basin itself.  
 Similar attention to the translation between vehicle and target is found in van 
Fraassen’s (2008) account which acknowledges the irreducible role for the agent in the 
representational relationship, but suggests that “a model can (be used to) represent a given 
phenomenon accurately only if it has a substructure isomorphic to that phenomenon” 
(2008, 309). Van Fraassen’s account thus draws our attention the relationship that holds 
between structures and substructures of a vehicle and a target, offering a different means 




 There are a myriad of pragmatic accounts of scientific representation, each of 
which, I have argued, contributes to our understanding of the wide-reaching and complex 
practice of representation in science. By drawing our attention to different features by 
providing alternative emphases, the accounts offer a tapestry of explanations. Further 
studies of this sort may reveal that certain accounts are more useful for an understanding 
of the representational practices found in some particular discipline or subdiscipline, 
associated with the use of particular types of vehicles, or performed for the sake of 
particular aims and goals. Whatever the case, it is clear that the plurality of pragmatic 
accounts is to be valued, not because each is partially correct, but rather because each is a 
unique perspective by which we can understand the wide, varied, and complex practice of 





CONCLUSION: SCIENCE IS REPLETE WITH HUMAN ACTIONS
1. Four Approaches to Representation 
One of the ways of explaining the value of my dissertation is to show how the 
perspective of locating scientific representation at the level of human action is distinct from 
other means of exploring scientific representation. Apart from the pragmatic approach, 
which I have deepened and further developed in my dissertation, there are three other 
prominent means of explaining the nature of scientific representation—the substantivist, 
internalist, and sociological accounts. The first of these, substantivist accounts of 
representation (similarity and (partial) isomorphism), approaches representation as if it 
were a relationship “out there” in the world. It appeals to a more fundamental relationship 
which is supposed to exist between features of the representational vehicle and features of 
its target.  
On the other hand is the view proposed by internalists (e.g., Callender and Cohen 
2006) which places the representational relationship entirely inside the minds of scientists. 
According to the internalist picture of scientific representation, we cannot explain the 
representational relationship in terms of the features holding of objects of the world, but 
rather in terms of the representational nature of our internal mental states. Representation, 
wherever it is utilized, turns out to be a relationship which is explained with reference to 
our minds and mental capacities, rather than a relationship which is explained by features 
in the world (as the substantivist perspective suggests).  
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A third approach, advocated by some sociologists of science (e.g., Lynch and 
Woolgar 1990), argues that representation is a feature of scientific practice. In order to 
understand representation in science, they argue, we must understand a wide range of 
heterogenous activities which are called representation. However, these sociologists of 
science argue that there is no “originary reality” (Lynch and Woolgar 1990, 8) to be 
represented. As such, there is no real ‘representation’ in science, but rather a set of activities 
by which scientists construct and abstract away from their targets. Sociologists of science 
present what Giere called a “no representation account of representation” (1994, 115).  
The fourth approach to the problem of representation is that offered by pragmatic 
accounts of scientific representation. As I have advanced and defended the pragmatic 
approach in this dissertation, it has both points of agreement and of significant departure 
from each of the three alternative approaches to the nature of representation in science. 
While I deny the substantivist’s claim that representation in science can be reduced 
to features of representational vehicles and their relationship to the world, I agree with the 
substantivist that representational use relies heavily upon the features which are built into 
representational vehicles. In chapter four, I argued that an investigation of representational 
means (like similarity and isomorphism) is one of the ways we can come to a better 
understanding of scientific practice. Indeed, the construction or development of similarity 
and isomorphism in any given representational vehicle would constitute a significant 
element of what I describe in chapter two as the representational licensing of the vehicle.  
I agree also with the internalists (and with the pragmatists) that there is an 
irreducible role for the scientist in understanding the nature of scientific representation. My 
understanding of scientific representation defended in this dissertation requires that there 
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be individual, intelligent agents who perform scientific, representational actions. However, 
the internalist goes wrong by missing the broader role of scientific practice in these actions, 
as I argued in chapters three and four. Representation is not a feature that holds in virtue 
of a scientist’s mental states, but rather in virtue of her practical rationality: her actions 
performed in the context of the broader scientific community. 
With the sociologist of science, I acknowledge the central place and value of the 
scientific community in understanding representational practice in science. However, 
despite its complexity, I maintain that there is a real relationship of representation in 
science. To accommodate the complexity of scientific representation, we must 
acknowledge the wide range of means and ends which are involved in representational 
actions in science (as I described in chapter four).  
The pragmatic approach to scientific representation, as I have developed and 
defended it here, suggest that the relationship of representation is not located ‘out there’ in 
the world, nor is it located in the minds of agents, and neither is it a mere family 
resemblance of distinct activities. Instead, the relationship of representation in science is 
located at the level of human actions performed in accord with a practice. As Suárez has 
put it: scientific representation is located “‘in the world’, and more particularly in the social 
world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by those communities of 
inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (Suárez 2010, 99). Over the 
course of the chapters of my dissertation, I have further developed this idea—describing 
the role of the community in scientific representation (in chapter three), offering an account 
of scientific, representational actions (in chapter four), and explaining the history of and 
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continued relevance of pragmatic approaches to scientific representation (in chapters two 
and three).  
2. Value for Future Work 
 Apart from deepening and developing the pragmatic approach to the nature of 
scientific representation, there is additional value to my dissertation project in that it will 
serve as a groundwork for additional fruitful projects. There are three general types of 
future project which I see flowing directly from the work I have begun and developed in 
this dissertation. 
 The first main area of further research will continue to explore and investigate 
scientific representation through the lens of action theory in the way that I have initiated in 
this dissertation. One project that has strong promise is a further development of the 
concept of representational licensing, which I first introduced in chapter three. As a 
reminder, in that chapter I argued that an irreducible component of the representational 
relationship is the way in which it is licensed as a representation by the broader scientific 
community. While I provided a brief analysis of the concept and demonstrated its 
importance in reference to the development of the Lotka-Volterra model, there is more 
work to be done in better elucidating the concept and showing its relevance to 
representation in other contexts. As such, one potential project coming out of this 
dissertation is the further exploration and elucidation of the notion of representational 
licensing, both theoretically (providing a deeper analysis of the notion of licensing) and 
practically (using case studies to show how licensing functions within scientific practice). 
One of the features that makes my dissertation project  novel is the way in which it 
connects two literatures which are otherwise fairly unconnected: philosophy of science and 
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philosophy of action. The connection, as explored and utilized in this dissertation, has been 
unidirectional—using the insights from action theory to better elucidate and understand 
concepts in philosophy of science. I think there are also important and interesting studies 
which could be made by reversing this strategy, that is, by using work in the philosophy of 
science to better understand important concepts within the philosophy of action. As just 
one example, the literature within the philosophy of action on the topic of know-how and 
skills tends to focus on simple examples, e.g., riding a bike, skiing, playing piano, and 
playing chess. These may be helpful examples for initial forays into the concepts, but they 
lack much of the complexity which is often associated with many real-world skills which 
involve dynamic aims, complex sociological and practice-oriented interactions, and inter-
skill interactions. If we are going to develop a concept of skill which is useful in more 
complex studies—e.g., in education or virtue ethics—we will need to rely on more complex 
examples, which mimic the complexity found in learning and in living a virtuous life. As 
such, the complexity of skills as they function within scientific practice might form a solid 




Anscombe, G.E.M. 2000. Intention. 2nd ed. Harvard University Press. 
———. 2005. Human Life, Action and Ethics. Edited by L. Gormally and M. Geach. 
Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic. 
Bailer-Jones, Daniela. 2003. “When Scientific Models Represent.” International Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):59–74. 
———. 2009. Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Bartels, Andreas. 2006. “Defending the Structural Concept of Representation.” Theoria 21 
(1):7–19. 
Berryman, Alan A. 1992. “The Orgins and Evolution of Predator-Prey Theory.” Ecology 
73 (5):1530–1535. 
Boesch, Brandon. 2015. “Scientific Representation.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-repr/. 
———. 2017. “There Is a Special Problem of Scientific Representation.” Philosophy of 
Science, July. https://doi.org/10.1086/693989. 
Brading, Katherine, and Elaine Landry. 2006. “Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and 
Representation.” Philosophy of Science 73 (5):571–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/518327. 
Bueno, Otávio. 1997. “Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach.” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):585–610. 
Bueno, Otávio, and Steven French. 2011. “How Theories Represent.” The British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):857–894. 
Cain, Michael, William Bowman, and Sally Hacker. 2008. Ecology. Sunder, MA: Sinauer 
Associates. 
Callender, Craig, and Jonathan Cohen. 2006. “There Is No Special Problem about 
Scientific Representation.” Theoria 21 (1):67–85. 
Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cartwright, Nancy, Towfic Shomar, and Mauricio Suárez. 1995. “The Tool Box of 
Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example.” 
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44:137–149. 
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2010. “Informational versus Functional Theories of Scientific 
Representation.” Synthese 172 (2):197–213. 
Contessa, Gabriele. 2007. “Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative 
Reasoning.” Philosophy of Science 74 (1):48–68. 
———. 2011. In Scientific Models and Representation., edited by Steven French and Juha 
Saatsi, 120–37. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Coopmans, Catelijne, Janet Vertesi, Michael E. Lynch, and Steve Woolgar. 2014. 
Representation in Scientific Practice Revisited. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
136 
Da Costa, Newton CA, and Steven French. 2003. Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary 
Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Davidson, Donald. 2001. Essays on Actions and Events. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Elgin, Catherine Z. 2010. “Telling Instances.” In Beyond Mimesis and Convention, edited 
by Matthew Hunter and Roman Frigg, 1–17. New York: Springer. 
Elliott, Kevin C., and Daniel J. McKaughan. 2014. “Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple 
Goals of Science.” Philosophy of Science 81 (1):1–21. 
Foster, J.E. 1971. “History and Description of the Mississippi Basin Model.” U.S. Army 
Corp of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station. 
Frankfurt, Harry. 1998. “The Problem of Action.” In The Importance of What We Care 
About, 69–79. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
French, Steven. 2003. “A Model‐Theoretic Account of Representation (Or, I Don’t Know 
Much about Art…but I Know It Involves Isomorphism).” Philosophy of Science 70 
(5):1472–83. https://doi.org/10.1086/377423. 
French, Steven, and James Ladyman. 1999. “Reinflating the Semantic Approach.” 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):103–121. 
Frey, Jennifer. 2013. “Analytic Philosophy of Action: A Very Brief History.” Philosophy 
News 7. 
Frigg, Roman. 2006. “Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories.” 
Theoria 21 (1):49–65. 
Frigg, Roman, and James Nguyen. 2016a. “Scientific Representation.” In The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/scientific-representation/. 
———. 2016b. “The Fiction View of Models Reloaded.” The Monist 99 (3):225–242. 
Frisch, Mathias. 2014. “Models and Scientific Representations or: Who Is Afraid of 
Inconsistency?” Synthese 191 (13):3027–3040. 
———. 2015. “Users, Structures, and Representation.” British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 66 (2):285–306. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt032. 
Giere, Ronald N. 1988. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. University of Chicago 
Press. 
———. 1994. “No Representation without Representation.” Biology and Philosophy 9 
(1):113–120. 
———. 2004. “How Models Are Used to Represent Reality.” Philosophy of Science 71 
(5):742–752. 
———. 2010. “An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation.” 
Synthese 172 (2):269–81. 
Giraud, Yann. 2014. “Legitimizing Napkin Drawings: The Curious Dispersion of Laffer 
Curves, 1978–2008.” In Representation in Scientific Practice Revisited, edited by 
Catelijne Coopmans, Janet Vertesi, Michael E. Lynch, and Steve Woolgar. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2006. “The Strategy of Model-Based Science.” Biology and 
Philosophy 21 (5):725–740. 
———. 2009. “Models and Fictions in Science.” Philosophical Studies 143 (1):101–116. 




Goodwin, Richard. 1967. “A Growth Cycle.” In Capitalism and Economic Growth, edited 
by C. H. Feinstein, 165–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy 
of Natural Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hardy, Godfrey H. 1908. “Mendelian Proportions in a Mixed Population.” Science 28 
(706):49–50. 
Hesse, Mary. 1966. Models and Analogies in Science. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
Hughes, R. I. G. 1997. “Models and Representation.” Philosophy of Science 64:S325–36. 
Knuuttila, Tarja. 2005. “Models, Representation, and Mediation.” Philosophy of Science 
72 (5):1260–71. https://doi.org/10.1086/508124. 
———. 2009. “Some Consequences of the Pragmatist Approach to Representation.” In 
EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science, 139–148. New York: Springer. 
———. 2011. “Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based 
Representation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):262–
71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.034. 
———. 2014. “Reflexivity, Representation, and the Possibility of Constructivist Realism.” 
In New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, edited by M.C. Galavotti, S. 
Hartmann, M. Weber, W. Gonzalez, D. Diecks, and T. Uebel, 297–312. Dordecht: 
Springer. 
Knuuttila, Tarja, and Andrea Loettgers. 2012. “The Productive Tension: Mechanisms vs. 
Templates in Modeling the Phenomena.” Representations, Models, and 
Simulations, 2–24. 
———. 2014. “Varieties of Noise: Analogical Reasoning in Synthetic Biology.” Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 48:76–88. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.05.006. 
———. 2016. “Modelling as Indirect Representation? The Lotka–Volterra Model 
Revisited.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, axv055. 
Ladyman, James, Otavio Bueno, Mauricio Suarez, and Bas C. van Fraassen. 2011. 
“Scientific Representation: A Long Journey from Pragmatics to Pragmatics.” 
Metascience 3:417. 
Latour, Bruno. 1999. “Circulating Reference: Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest.” In 
Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
———. 2014. “The More Manipulations, the Better.” In Representation in Scientific 
Practice Revisited, edited by Catelijne Coopmans, Janet Vertesi, Michael E. Lynch, 
and Steve Woolgar. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Lotka, Alfred J. 1920a. “Analytical Note on Certain Rhythmic Relations in Organic 
Systems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 6 (7):410–415. 
———. 1920b. “Undamped Oscillations Derived from the Law of Mass Action.” Journal 
of the American Chemical Society 42 (8):1595–1599. 
Lynch, Michael, and Steve Woolgar. 1990. Representation in Scientific Practice. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Mäki, Uskali. 2009. “Missing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate 
Systems.” Erkenntnis (1975-) 70 (1):29–43. 
 
138 
Mississippi Basin Model Board. 1945. “Report of First Meeting of Mississippi Basin 
Model Board.” Mississippi Basin Model Report 2-1. Mississippi Basin Model 
Board. 
Morgan, Mary, and Margaret Morrison. 1999a. “Models as Mediating Instruments.” In 
Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, 10–37. 
———. 1999b. Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Connor, Flannery. 1988. “The Catholic Novelist in the Protestant South.” In Flannery 
O’Connor: Collected Works, 853–64. New York: Literary Classics of the United 
States. 
Perini, Laura. 2005a. “Explanation in Two Dimensions: Diagrams and Biological 
Explanation.” Biology and Philosophy 20 (2–3):257–269. 
———. 2005b. “Visual Representations and Confirmation.” Philosophy of Science 72 
(5):913–26. https://doi.org/10.1086/508949. 
Sheredos, Benjamin, Daniel Burnston, Adele Abrahamsen, and William Bechtel. 2013. 
“Why Do Biologists Use So Many Diagrams?” Philosophy of Science 80 (5):931–
44. 
Suárez, Mauricio. 2003. “Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism.” 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):225–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0269859032000169442. 
———. 2004. “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation.” Philosophy of 
Science 71 (5):767–79. https://doi.org/10.1086/421415. 
———. 2010. “Scientific Representation.” Philosophy Compass 5 (1):91–101. 
———. 2015a. “Deflationary Representation, Inference, and Practice.” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:36–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.11.001. 
———. 2015b. “Representation in Science.” Edited by Paul Humphreys. Oxford 
Handbook in Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press. 





Teller, Paul. 2001. “Twilight of the Perfect Model Model.” Erkenntnis (1975-) 55 (3):393–
415. 
Toon, Adam. 2012. “Similarity and Scientific Representation.” International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science 26 (3):241–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2012.731730. 
Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientific Image. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2008. Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Oxford : New York: 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford UniversityPress. 
Volterra, Vito. 1926. “Fluctuations in the Abundance of a Species Considered 
Mathematically.” Nature 118 (2972):558–560. 
———. 1928. “Variations and Fluctuations of the Number of Individuals in Animal 
Species Living Together.” ICES Journal of Marine Science 3 (1):3–51. 
 
139 
Weisberg, Michael. 2007a. “Three Kinds of Idealization.” The Journal of Philosophy 104 
(12):639–659. 
———. 2007b. “Who Is a Modeler?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 
(2):207–33. 
———. 2013. Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World. Oxford 
Studies in Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. 
Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. 4th ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Woody, Andrea I. 2004. “More Telltale Signs: What Attention to Representation Reveals 
about Scientific Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 71 (5):780–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/421416. 
Zuppone, Romina. 2014. “?Existen Diferencias Esenciales Entre Representatciones 
Artísticas Y Científicas? Consecuencias Para Una Teoría General de La 




COPYRIGHT AND REPRINT INFORMATION
Chapter 2 – Boesch, B. (2015) Scientific representation. Internet Encyclopedia of 




Chapter 3 – Boesch, B. (2017) There is a special problem of scientific representation. 






Chapter 4 – Boesch, B. (2017). The means-end account of scientific, representational 
actions. Synthese. Published Online. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1537-2. 
 
 
 
